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Presidential Obstruction of Justice
Daniel J. Hemel* & Eric A. Posner**
Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from
interfering with official legal proceedings based on a “corrupt”
motive. But what about the president of the United States? The
president is vested with “executive power,” which includes the power
to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that the statutes
do not apply to the president because if they did they would violate the
president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the
obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the
president, and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for
intervening in an investigation is to further personal, pecuniary, or
narrowly partisan interests, rather than to advance the public good. A
brief tour of presidential scandals indicates that, without anyone
noticing it, the law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major
check on presidential power.
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INTRODUCTION
Can a president be held criminally liable for obstruction of justice? That
question took on new urgency in May 2017 after President Donald Trump fired
James Comey as director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). While the
president cited Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein’s determination that
Comey had mishandled the investigation into Hillary Clinton’s disclosure of
classified emails, Trump later admitted in an interview that he “was going to fire
[Comey] regardless of the recommendation.” 1 Because Trump had also signaled
to Comey that he was unhappy with the FBI’s investigation of former National
Security Advisor Michael Flynn, speculation arose that Trump had fired Comey
to punish him for failing to drop the investigation of Flynn. This in turn sparked
allegations that Trump had committed the crime of obstruction of justice, which
consists of interference with investigations, prosecutions, and other law
enforcement actions with “corrupt” intent.2
President Trump is not the first president to be accused of obstruction of
justice. The first article of impeachment against President Richard Nixon, which
was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee in 1974, accused him of
obstructing the investigation into the Watergate burglary by interfering with an
FBI investigation.3 The article also mentioned interference with the investigation

1. I Was Going to Fire Comey Anyway, Trump Tells Lester Holt in Interview (NBC News
broadcast May 11, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/i-was-going-to-fire-comeyanyway-trump-tells-lester-holt-in-interview-941538371971 [https://perma.cc/SAV6-RZJB].
2. See Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memo Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/us/politics/james-comey-trumpflynn-russia-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/3WVT-QUH3]; Samuel W. Buell, Open and Shut:
The Obstruction of Justice Case Against Trump Is Already a Slam Dunk, SLATE (July 6, 2017, 10:59
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_obstruction_of
_justice_case_against_trump_is_already_a_slam_dunk.html [https://perma.cc/8EN9-VSTL].
3. PETER W. RODINO, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 1–2 (1974).
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by the Watergate special prosecutor, whose firing was ordered by Nixon.4 Highranking Reagan administration officials were indicted on obstruction of justice
charges related to the Iran-Contra affair, and several of President Reagan’s
opponents suggested that he may have committed obstruction as well (though
those allegations were never proven).5 After President George H.W. Bush
pardoned former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, who was one of the
Reagan administration officials charged with obstruction in the Iran-Contra
scandal, Bush was accused of obstructing the investigation into his own role in
the scandal.6 The House impeached President Bill Clinton in 1998, based in part
on obstruction of justice.7 The allegations against Clinton included charges that
he had lied and withheld evidence in a civil action and lied to a grand jury.8
Obstruction of justice controversies also entangled the George W. Bush
administration in the wake of firings of US attorneys,9 and the onetime chief of
staff to Vice President Dick Cheney was convicted of obstruction.10 Amazingly,
six of the last nine presidents, or their top aides, were embroiled in obstruction
of justice scandals. The law of obstruction of justice has evolved into a major
check on presidential power, without anyone noticing it.
But the claim that the president can commit such a crime faces a powerful
objection rooted in the Constitution. Obstruction of justice laws are normally
applied to private citizens—those who bribe jurors, hide evidence from the
police, or lie to investigators. The president is the head of the executive branch
and therefore also the head of federal law enforcement. He can fire the FBI
director, the attorney general, or any other principal officer in the executive
branch who fails to maintain his confidence. If President Trump can fire an FBI
director merely for displeasing him, why can’t he fire an FBI director who
pursues an investigation that the president wants shut down?
The president’s control over law enforcement is sometimes regarded as a
near-sacred principle in our constitutional system. In Justice Scalia’s words,
“[g]overnmental investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially
executive function.”11 The principle has several justifications. First, as Justice
Scalia notes, presidential control over law enforcement limits the risk of

4.
5.

Id. at 123–24.
See, e.g., Terence Hunt, White House Ready to “Take Lumps” on Iran Arms Scandal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 14, 1987 (quoting Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee); Evans Witt, Feminist Leader Calls for Female Leadership, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 9,
1987 (quoting president of the National Organization for Women).
6. See Robert Nida & Rebecca L. Spiro, The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal
Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power, 52 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 214–15 (1999).
7. H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part I.C.4.
10. See Carol D. Leonnig & Amy Goldstein, Libby Found Guilty in CIA Leak Case, WASH.
POST (Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/06
/AR2007030600648.html [https://perma.cc/5KSX-MXVR].
11. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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legislative tyranny: if Congress passes bad laws, the president can weaken their
effect by refusing to enforce them or enforcing them only in limited cases.
Second, the president is the only individual who is electorally accountable to the
entire country for the general operation of the national government. Given
limited budgets, someone needs to decide on enforcement priorities, which
means blocking some types of enforcement while authorizing others. That
someone is, as a matter of custom and design, the president, whose synoptic
vision and electoral accountability to the national public make him well qualified
to perform that function.
But the principle of presidential control comes into conflict with other
constitutional values. The first is the idea that no person is above the law.12 Few
would argue that the president should be able to commit a crime and then call
off the resulting investigation. What if he murdered his valet? The second, and
perhaps more serious, interest at stake is that a president ought not to use his
control of law enforcement to hamper political opposition. It is obvious enough
that it would be wrong for the president to order spurious investigations of his
political opponents in order to harass them. But it would seem to follow that the
president should not call off investigations of his political aides and allies (and
of himself) in order to protect them (and himself) from legal jeopardy. If he
could, then he or his aides could engage in criminal activity in order to harass
their political opponents—as the Watergate burglary, a spy operation against the
Democratic National Committee, illustrates—without fear of legal liability.
The founders recognized this conundrum and sought to address it by
granting Congress the impeachment power. Congress was not supposed to
impeach a president merely because of political disagreement. Impeachment was
supposed to be based on “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors”13—in Alexander Hamilton’s words, it was to “proceed
from . . . the abuse or violation of some public trust.”14 The Senate was supposed
to act in a “judicial” manner when it convened as a court to try impeachments.
As such, it would develop a set of precedents that would guide impeachment
proceedings going forward.15
More than two-and-a-quarter centuries have elapsed without the Senate
determining whether presidential obstruction of justice is a high crime or
misdemeanor that might warrant removal from office. President Nixon resigned
before he could be impeached. The Senate split 50–50 on the obstruction of
justice charge against President Clinton. Moreover, questions of impeachability
and indictability are distinct—obstruction by the president might be a “high
crime or misdemeanor” in the Senate but not a punishable offense in federal

12. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974) (rejecting the notion that “a
President is above the law”).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. Id.
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court.16 The latter question likewise remains open: President Ford’s pardon
preempted the possibility that Nixon might stand trial on charges of obstructing
justice while in the White House. For his part, President Clinton agreed to a fiveyear suspension of his law license and a $25,000 fine in order to avert criminal
prosecution on obstruction and other charges.17
In this Article,18 we argue that the crime of obstruction of justice does apply
to the president, but it applies in a special way because of the president’s role as
16. See Lawrence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic Principles, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 717 (1999) (“[I]t appears to be all but universally agreed that an offense need
not be a violation of criminal law at all in order for it to be impeachable as a high crime or
misdemeanor.”).
17. Opinion, Mr. Clinton’s Last Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/opinion/mr-clinton-s-last-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/6GN3Z3WA].
18. This expands upon arguments we have sketched out, individually and together, in a series
of blog posts and opinion pieces. See Eric Posner, Can the President Commit the Crime of Obstruction
of Justice?, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 9, 2017), http://ericposner.com/can-the-president-commit-thecrime-of-obstruction-of-justice [https://perma.cc/X92Y-CD5G] (arguing that a president can be
criminally liable for obstruction of justice if the action taken is “corrupt”); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner,
Can the President Commit the Crime of Obstruction?, II, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 10, 2017),
http://ericposner.com/can-the-president-commit-the-crime-of-obstruction-ii
[https://perma.cc/S9P59D79] (explaining that motive helps define those sets of actions for which the president’s enforcement
authority may be constrained); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, When Does the President Commit
Obstruction of Justice?, III, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 12, 2017), http://ericposner.com/when-does-thepresident-commit-obstruction-of-justice-iii [https://perma.cc/WTW3-5AKE] (outlining the difficulty in
determining the reasoning behind a president’s action in mixed motive situations); Daniel Hemel & Eric
Posner, Meta-Obstruction of Justice, ERICPOSNER.COM (June 13, 2017), http://ericposner.com/metaobstruction-of-justice [https://perma.cc/K64S-MJNN] (exploring whether a president could be
criminally liable for obstructing an investigation into obstruction of justice); Daniel Hemel & Eric
Posner, Opinion, The Case for Obstruction Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/the-case-for-obstruction-charges.html
[https://perma.cc/B3NT-MWPV] (arguing that there is a strong case Donald Trump committed
obstruction of justice when he fired James Comey after seeking to influence his investigation into
Michael Flynn); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, Opinion, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crimerussia.html [https://perma.cc/J6ST-8XSV] (arguing that if Trump pardons family members and other
aides, he may be guilty of obstructing justice); Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, The Obstruction of Justice
Case
Against
Donald
Trump,
SLATE
(July
27,
2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/trump_is_violating_federal_la
w_by_pushing_sessions_to_go_after_hillary_clinton.html [https://perma.cc/HSA2-8FU3] (arguing that
there is a strong case Trump obstructed justice by pressuring the Justice Department to investigate
Hillary Clinton and James Comey). We have benefitted from the writings of others who have considered
the application of the obstruction statutes to President Trump in recent months. See, e.g., Buell, supra,
note 2 (arguing that Trump committed criminal obstruction of justice by pressuring Comey to drop the
Flynn investigation and firing Comey); Frank O. Bowman, Sam Buell on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE
OFFENSES? (July 8, 2017), https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/08/sam-buell-on-obstruction
[https://perma.cc/7PTK-9CHS] (questioning the assertion that Trump’s criminal liability for obstruction
is a “slam dunk” and outlining the complexities of proving motive in such cases); Samuel W. Buell &
Frank O. Bowman, Professor Buell Responds on Obstruction, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES? (July 10,
2017),
https://impeachableoffenses.net/2017/07/10/professor-buell-responds-on-obstruction
[https://perma.cc/2A2N-VKSG] (critiquing scholars’ views on whether Trump could be held liable for
obstruction and concluding that more facts showing corruption make it more likely under any theory of
presidential obstruction).
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head of the executive branch. As defined by statute and precedent, the crime of
obstruction occurs when an individual “corruptly” endeavors to impede or
influence an investigation or other proceeding, and the word “corruptly” is
understood to mean “with an improper purpose.”19 When the president impedes
or influences an investigation with a proper purpose, he does not commit the
crime of obstruction. The critical question, then, is when it is proper for the
president to intervene.
Article II of the Constitution suggests an answer to that question. It vests
the president with “executive power,” obligates him to “take care that the laws
be faithfully executed,”20 and gives some other roles and functions like that of
commander in chief. When these authorities empower him to achieve certain
goals, he is allowed to drop or block prosecutions and other enforcement actions
that interfere with those goals. For example, if the president intervenes in an
investigation because he thinks that national security demands it, he acts properly
and not corruptly. Likewise, if the president decides in good faith that a particular
investigation or class of investigations represents a poor use of scarce
enforcement resources, he may block it (or them) without committing
obstruction of justice.21 But if the president interferes with an investigation
because he worries that it might bring to light criminal activity that he, his family,
or his top aides committed—and not for reasons related to national security or
the faithful execution of federal law—then he acts corruptly, and thus criminally.
The Constitution does not authorize the president to employ his office for
personal or partisan advantage, and intervening in an investigation for that
purpose is not a proper use of presidential power.
In Part I, we provide background on the crime of obstruction of justice and
on the president’s authority over law enforcement. We propose a test for
presidential obstruction of justice that balances competing constitutional values
in a workable way. While the application of the obstruction statutes to the
president raises a number of novel legal questions, courts considering these
questions have several sources from which to draw. First, specific constitutional
provisions support a broader structural inference that a president abuses his
power when he uses his office to pursue personal, pecuniary, and narrowly
partisan objectives. Second, ethical and legal guidelines that control lower-level
law enforcement officials buttress the notion that prosecutorial discretion does
not allow one to wield law enforcement power for personal, pecuniary, and
partisan ends. While the application of the obstruction statutes to the president
presents questions that are in some sense sui generis, these questions are in other

19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018).
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
21. We take no position on whether the Take Care Clause or any other provision forbids the
president from refusing to enforce statutes for good faith policy reasons; in any event, we do not believe
that such action could count as “obstruction of justice.” We discuss this issue in Part I.B.
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respects analogous to the challenges addressed elsewhere in the Constitution,
and to challenges that federal prosecutors routinely face.
In Part II, we address a range of complications and counterarguments. First,
we address the problem of mixed motives. Does a president obstruct justice if he
stops an investigation for both personal reasons and reasons of the public
interest? We argue that he does if the personal reason is a but-for cause of the
action. Second, we consider the argument that a crime of presidential obstruction
of justice is inconsistent with the pardon power. According to this argument,
since the president may pardon someone before that person has been convicted
of a crime, and such a pardon could halt an investigation, the president cannot
coherently be found criminally liable for obstructing justice. We reject this
argument. Even if the pardon power is plenary (and we note several objections
to that view), halting an investigation and pardoning a person are different
actions, with different political costs, so there is no inconsistency between
criminalizing obstruction of justice and allowing pardons. Further, we argue that
if a president pardons someone in order to obstruct justice, the president may be
guilty of a crime even if the pardon itself is valid in the sense that it releases the
pardoned person from criminal liability.
Third, we briefly address the argument that all talk of presidential
obstruction of justice is idle because the president cannot be convicted of a crime
while in office. The problem with this view is that impeachment is at least partly
based on criminal activity, so it may matter whether obstruction of justice is a
crime. Moreover, it is possible that the president can be convicted of a crime
while in office; and even if he cannot, he can be convicted after he leaves office
of a crime that he committed while in office.
Finally, we discuss and reject the argument that the canon of constitutional
avoidance—the principle that statutory ambiguities should be resolved in a way
that avoids difficult constitutional questions—cuts against applying the
obstruction of justice statutes to the president. The avoidance canon applies only
in cases of ambiguity, and there is nothing in the text or the legislative history of
the obstruction statutes that suggests the president might be excluded.
I.
ANALYSIS
A. Obstruction of Justice
Obstruction of justice is an offense with roots in the nation’s founding. The
Declaration of Independence charged King George III with “obstruct[ing] the
Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing
Judiciary powers.”22 George interfered with the establishment of courts, not with
particular investigations, but the principle is the same. While we will not belabor
22.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776).
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this point, we note that if the king could commit obstruction of justice, surely the
president, whose executive power is more limited, can as well.
The first federal obstruction statute, which dates from 1831,23 provided for
the punishment of “any person or persons” who “corruptly, or by threats or force,
obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or impede, the due administration
of justice” in “any court of the United States.”24 This original obstruction statute
has survived with relatively minor modifications and is now codified as section
1503 of title 18.25
Since the 19th century, Congress has added several more obstruction
statutes to the criminal code.26 While the various statutes differ in their scope, all
share three basic elements. First, they all contain a similar actus reus
requirement: the defendant must influence, obstruct, or impede the due
administration of justice, or endeavor to do the same. Second, they include the
same mens rea requirement: the defendant must act “corruptly.” Third, they all
include a scope limitation: corruptly obstructing the administration of justice in
the abstract is not enough for criminal liability. The obstruction must affect some
sort of proceeding.
1. Actus Reus
To be guilty of obstruction under federal law, a person must satisfy the
crime’s actus reus requirement: he must—or must endeavor to—influence,

23. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. 487. Prior to this, the crime of obstruction was not
sharply distinguished from contempt of court. See Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The
Obstruction of Justice Puzzle, 82 MICH. L. REV. 90, 97 (1983). The 1831 law limited contempt to cases
involving misbehavior in or near federal courts, misbehavior by court officers, and disobedience of court
orders. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. at 487–88. Obstruction applied to misdeeds that occurred
farther afield.
24. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 2, 4 Stat. at 488.
25. Section 1503(a) provides (in relevant part) that “[w]hoever . . . corruptly or by threats or
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a) (2018).
26. In addition to section 1503, two more obstruction statutes are particularly relevant to
presidential conduct. Section 1505, added in 1940, provides (in relevant part) that:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication
influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and
proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before
any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power
of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any
committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress . . . [s]hall be fined . . . ,
imprisoned . . . , or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2018); see Act of Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (1940). Section 1512(c),
added in 2002, provides (in relevant part) that:
Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts
to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2018); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat.
745, 806.
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obstruct, or impede a covered proceeding.27 In the run-of-the-mill obstruction
case, the defendant is charged with altering, concealing, or destroying
subpoenaed documents, or with encouraging or giving false testimony,28 but
courts have applied the obstruction statutes to a range of other activities as well.29
In one case, a witness was convicted of obstruction after he claimed memory loss
134 times in a 90-minute Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
deposition.30 In another case, a defendant was convicted of obstruction for
obtaining grand jury transcripts from a typist who worked for a court reporter
service and then sharing them with the target of the grand jury probe.31 In still
another case, a criminal defense lawyer was convicted of obstruction after filing
a flood of motions in state and federal court knowing that they contained an
inaccurate rendition of events.32
The actus reus requirement does not require that an obstruction conviction
be predicated on a single act. A “continuing course of conduct” that obstructs an
investigation can be the basis for guilt.33 And as the use of the verbs “endeavor”
and “attempt” in the obstruction statutes suggests, a defendant can be convicted
of obstruction even if his effort to stymie an investigation does not succeed.
Moreover, a defendant who is innocent of the underlying charge can be convicted
of obstructing the investigation into that charge.34 Obstruction of justice is an
independent crime.
But of course, it cannot be the case that any action or course of conduct that
might interfere with an investigation of any charge constitutes criminal
obstruction. The criminal defense lawyer who moves to quash a subpoena
thereby impedes an investigation, but that does not mean that he should go to
jail. What “separates the wheat from the chaff” in obstruction cases is the mens
rea requirement: to be guilty of obstruction, a defendant must act with a “corrupt
purpose.”35
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (“influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice”); § 1505 (“influences, obstructs, or impedes or
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law”); § 1512(c)(2)
(“obstructs, influences, or impedes . . . , or attempts to do so”).
28. See Matthew Harrington & Benjamin Schiffelbein, Obstruction of Justice, 51 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1477, 1488–90 (2014).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (Section 1503
“reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing [an] effect that prevents justice from being duly
administered, regardless of the means employed.”).
30. United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 752–54 (2d Cir. 1971) (A witness’s “blatantly evasive”
testimony can qualify as obstruction even though it might not rise to level of perjury.).
31. United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 672–73, 675–79 (6th Cir. 1985).
32. United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 628–35 (7th Cir. 1998).
33. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
34. See United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that individuals
charged with obstructing an IRS proceeding could not defend themselves on the ground that the
underlying tax levy was invalid).
35. See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 995 (1st Cir. 1987) (“When all is said and done,
what separates the wheat from the chaff in this case is the plentitude of evidence developed at trial from
which the jury could have concluded that [the defendant acted] with corrupt purpose . . . .”).
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2. Mens Rea
What exactly does it mean for a defendant to act with a “corrupt purpose,”
and thus to meet the mens rea requirement for obstruction?36 Four possible
interpretations emerge from the case law, of which the fourth—that “corruptly”
means with “an improper purpose”—is the most widely accepted.
One view is that a defendant acts “corruptly” whenever he specifically
seeks to interfere with a proceeding.37 On this view, “the word ‘corruptly’ means
nothing more than an intent to obstruct the proceeding.”38 But this view goes too
far by interfering with accepted elements of the adversary proceeding. Everyone
agrees that the defense lawyer who knows his client is guilty but gives a rousing
closing statement that leads to the client’s acquittal does not commit obstruction,
even though he endeavors to influence the due administration of justice. The
problems with this view are even more acute in the context of section 1505,
which applies to endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede administrative and
congressional proceedings. Minority party lawmakers, executive branch
officials, and political activists all seek to influence congressional inquiries. One
does not commit obstruction of justice simply by participating in the hurly burly
of interest group politics.39
A second view is that the term “corruptly” does not refer to mens rea but
instead to the means by which a defendant obstructs justice. If the defendant acts
illegally in the course of obstructing the due administration of justice, then his
conduct falls within the ambit of the obstruction statute. Judge Laurence
Silberman pointed out the virtues of this view in a dissenting opinion in the case
of Oliver North, a Reagan administration official convicted of obstructing
Congress’s investigation into the Iran-Contra affair:
If the jury focuses on the means chosen by the defendant in his endeavor
to obstruct, it would not necessarily need to probe the morality or
propriety of the defendant’s purpose—something the criminal law
ordinarily eschews . . . . [T]he “means” view does seem to mitigate that
problem since, for example, a defendant who bribes the chairman of a
congressional committee can be said to have acted “corruptly” no matter
how laudable his underlying motive.40

36. Sections 1503 and 1505 also make it a crime to obstruct justice “by threats or force, or by
any threatening letter or communication.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1505 (2018). Our focus here is on
harder cases in which the threat and force prongs of the obstruction statutes do not apply.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503(a) to require an act “done with the purpose of obstructing justice”).
38. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (summarizing case law from
other circuits without adopting this view).
39. See id. (“No one can seriously question that people constantly attempt, in innumerable ways,
to obstruct or impede congressional committees . . . . but it does not necessarily follow that [they do] so
corruptly.”).
40. Id. at 943 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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One possible objection to this means-based view is that it renders the
obstruction of justice statutes redundant with other statutes, so that obstruction
serves as no more than a sentencing enhancement. If “corruptly” requires that
the defendant’s act be independently unlawful, then the obstruction statutes
merely enhance the penalties for an act that the criminal law already proscribes.
In any event, as we shall soon see, Congress has decisively rejected the meansbased view.
A third view comes from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in the case of John
Poindexter, who served as national security advisor to President Reagan and
who—like North—was later charged with and convicted of obstruction in
connection with the Iran-Contra scandal. The majority opinion in the Poindexter
case suggested that the term “corruptly” in section 1505 should be read
“transitively”: a defendant “corruptly” obstructs a proceeding when he interferes
with the proceeding “by means of corrupting another.”41 More specifically, the
majority suggested that the statute should “include only ‘corrupting’ another
person by influencing him to violate his legal duty.”42 But courts had long
construed the obstruction statutes to apply to defendants whose solo actions
interfered with a proceeding.43 Moreover, it is a puzzle why Congress would
have wanted to punish defendants who encourage others to violate their legal
duties but not to punish defendants who violate their own legal duties.44
Congress decisively rejected the D.C. Circuit’s “transitive” interpretation.
The False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, which abrogated the
Poindexter ruling,45 provides that “[a]s used in section 1505, the term ‘corruptly’
means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another,
including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing,
altering, or destroying a document or other information.”46 And while the 1996
law on its face applies only to section 1505, the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to align the construction of “corruptly” in section 1505 with
the interpretation of that term in the other obstruction statutes.47 Senator Levin,
one of the bill’s sponsors, said that the bill would “bring [section 1505] back into

41. United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
42. Id. at 379.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (submitting false
statement to congressional committee); United States v. Vixie, 532 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1976)
(submitting false documents in response to IRS subpoena); United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1971) (giving evasive testimony).
44. See Poindexter, 951 F.2d at 390–91 (Mikva, J., dissenting in part) (noting the strange result
of the majority’s transitive interpretation).
45. False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, § 3, 110 Stat. 3459
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (2018)); see United States v. Hassoun, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226–27
(S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that “Poindexter’s holding ha[s] been overturned by Congress’ enactment of 18
U.S.C. § 1515(b)”).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b).
47. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2018) (obstruction of grand jury or court proceeding); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b) (2018) (obstruction of “official proceeding” by persuading or misleading another person).
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line with other obstruction statutes protecting government inquiries.”48 And
indeed, several other courts had previously interpreted the term “corruptly” in
other obstruction statutes to mean just that: motivated by an “improper
purpose.”49
This fourth view—that “corruptly” means motivated by an “improper
purpose”—is now the near-consensus view among the courts of appeals.50 Yet
agreeing that “corruptly” refers to “improper purpose” still leaves the question
of which purposes are “proper.” The answer depends on the actor’s role. The
prosecutor who intervenes in an investigation because he thinks it represents a
misallocation of law enforcement resources acts with a proper purpose. In
general, prosecutors have broad discretion to bring or drop cases based on a
range of logistical and administrative reasons, and any such decision made in
good faith is not improper. In contrast, ordinary citizens are not vested with this
discretion. The citizen activist who obstructs an investigation because he thinks
it represents a misallocation of law enforcement resources might well be
criminally liable.
The role-based nature of the mens rea inquiry does not imply that
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from obstruction charges. Consider the
case of former Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane, who clashed
repeatedly with a Philadelphia prosecutor, Frank Fina.51 While she was attorney
general, Kane allegedly leaked secret grand jury documents to a Philadelphia
newspaper implying that Fina had bungled a probe of a Philadelphia civil rights
48. False Statements After the Hubbard v. United States Decision: Hearing on S. 1734 Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d sess., at 5 (May 14, 1996).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978) (construing § 1503 to
require acting corruptly by having an improper purpose); United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 642 (5th
Cir. 1977) (“[T]he word ‘corruptly’ in § 1503 means a defendant acted with improper motive or with
bad or evil or wicked purpose” (some internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Haldeman,
559 F.2d 31, 115 n.229 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting jury instructions stating that “[t]he word, ‘corruptly’,
as used in [section 1503] simply means having an evil or improper purpose or intent”).
50. See United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Acting ‘corruptly’
within the meaning of § 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct
knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct . . . .”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (“corruptly”
as used in section 1512(c)(2) means “with an improper purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly
and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct” an official proceeding); United
States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 296 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the caselaw, ‘corruptly’
requires an improper purpose”) (emphasis in original), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 544 U.S.
696 (2005); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “we have
interpreted the term ‘corruptly,’ as it appears in § 1503, to mean motivated by an improper purpose,”
and extending that interpretation to section 1512(b)); Brown v. United States, 89 A.3d 98, 104 (D.C.
2014) (“individuals act ‘corruptly’ when they are ‘motivated by an improper purpose’”); see also Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 705 (2005) (in construing section 1512(b), noting that
“‘Corrupt’ and ‘corruptly’ are normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil” acts).
51. See Charles Thompson, In Kathleen Kane v. Frank Fina, Bad Blood, Porn and Leaks Make
for
Mutually
Assured
Destruction,
PENNLIVE
(Aug.
26,
2015),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2015/08/post_787.html
[https://perma.cc/79HWKQVW].
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leader.52 When her subordinates suggested that the Attorney General’s Office
should look into the leak, Kane reportedly told her staff not to investigate the
matter and also asked one of her subordinates to take action to shut down a grand
jury probe into the leak.53 On the basis of this evidence, Kane was indicted for
obstruction of justice under Pennsylvania law.54 She was ultimately convicted of
obstruction as well as other charges.55
The Kane case suggests that a prosecutor who abuses her position to tar a
political rival and then tries to shut down any inquiry into the matter thereby
commits obstruction of justice. But what of a district attorney who drops an
investigation of a popular celebrity because of a possible adverse public reaction
that would harm his chances of reelection?56 Would it change matters if the
district attorney’s decision was not political, but resulted from his personal
affection for the celebrity stemming from the celebrity’s role in a long-ago
television show? Case law provides little guidance. The Pandora’s box of
hypotheticals does not mean, however, that prosecutors who abuse their power
for personal, pecuniary, or partisan ends get off scot-free, as the Kane episode
illustrates.
The application of the obstruction statutes to the president in particular
would raise sensitive questions regarding the president’s proper role in law
enforcement. Part I.B takes up those questions.
3. Scope Limitations
The scope of the federal prohibition on obstruction of justice has expanded
incrementally over the course of nearly two centuries, with the result that the
prohibition now applies to a wide swath of obstructive conduct affecting federal
law enforcement. Three statutes in particular—sections 1503, 1505, and 1512 of

52. See Presentment No. 60 at 9–12, In re Thirty-Five Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 624
A.3d 204 (Pa. 2014) (No. 171 M.D. 2012, Notice No. 123), https://bit.ly/2vvozZW
[https://perma.cc/VLQ5-W9KJ].
53. See id. at 16.
54. Id. at 27. The language of the relevant Pennsylvania statute differs slightly from the federal
analogue. It applies to anyone who “intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law
or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official
duty, or any other unlawful act.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101. Pennsylvania courts have understood the
provision to apply when a public official “perform[s] . . . a discretionary duty with an improper or
corrupt motive.” See In re Gentile, 654 A.2d 676, 684 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 1994) (opinion of Johnson,
J.).
55. See Jess Bidgood, Pennsylvania’s Attorney General Is Convicted on All Counts, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/16/us/trial-kathleen-kane-pennsylvania-attorneygeneral.html [https://perma.cc/NA6P-UVZD].
56. As it turns out, the District Attorney of Montgomery County, Pa., who declined to prosecute
comedian Bill Cosby in 2005, may have lost a later election because of that decision. See Justin Wm.
Moyer, The Prosecutor Undone by a ‘Secret Agreement’ with Bill Cosby, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/02/04/the-prosecutor-undone-by-asecret-agreement-with-bill-cosby/?utm_term=.689dcd0b71ee [https://perma.cc/ZKT5-FX9U].
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title 1857—now cover conduct that interferes with the operations of the judicial,
legislative, and executive branches.
The first obstruction statute in 1831 applied only to obstruction of justice
in federal court. And while the modern version of that statute, section 1503, now
on its face applies more broadly to obstruction of the “due administration of
justice” anywhere, courts have interpreted it to apply only to the obstruction of
federal judicial proceedings (including grand jury investigations).58 Thus,
obstruction of a federal criminal investigation prior to the filing of an indictment
would not come within the scope of section 1503.
Section 1505, enacted in 1940, does apply beyond federal court to
obstruction of any proceeding pending before a “department or agency of the
United States,” or before Congress.59 Just how far it applies has been a subject
of confusion. For the first several decades after the statute’s enactment, courts
routinely applied section 1505 to the obstruction of investigations by federal
agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the SEC.60 But in a
1981 case, United States v. Higgins, a federal district court held that section 1505
did not apply to obstruction of an FBI probe.61 The district court said it was
“convinced, after careful examination of the case law and pertinent legislative
history,” that section 1505 applied only to agencies with rulemaking or
adjudicative powers and not to purely investigatory agencies such as the FBI.62
The “case law and pertinent legislative history” cited by Higgins offer little
support for the court’s conclusion. Higgins relies on United States v. Mitchell, a
1973 decision in which another district court stated that under section 1505 “it
was not a crime to obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before the

57. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a), 1505, 1512(b) (2018).
58. See United States v. Scoratow, 137 F. Supp. 620, 621–22 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (the phrase “‘due
administration of justice’ . . . . is qualified and limited by the enumeration of specific judicial functions
concerned with the ‘administration’ of justice.”) (emphasis in original); accord United States v.
Simmons, 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (“A prerequisite for conviction [under section 1503] is the
pendency at the time of the alleged obstruction of some sort of judicial proceeding that qualifies as an
‘administration of justice.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir.
1971) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has “approved the decision in United States v. Scoratow”); United
States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 416 (2d Cir. 1960) (citing Scoratow, 137 F. Supp 620) (“Falsehoods
given before non-judicial inquiries are not encompassed within 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the federal obstruction
of justice statute . . . .”).
59. Act of Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, § 135(a), 54 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1505).
60. See United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1970) (Immigration and
Naturalization Service); United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1020–21 (6th Cir. 1970) (FTC);
Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 712–13 (8th Cir. 1966) (National Labor Relations Board); United
States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492, 493–94 (D.D.C. 1964) (obstruction of SEC investigation); United
States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 699–704 (W.D. La. 1949) (obstruction of Federal Petroleum Board
investigation). See generally United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1984) (“Agency
investigative activities are ‘proceedings’ within the meaning of § 1505.”).
61. United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981).
62. Id.
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initiation of proceedings within the scope” of that statute.63 But Mitchell fails to
resolve the question of what proceedings fall within the scope of section 1505;
it simply notes that section 1505 applies only after such proceedings are
underway. Moreover, the Second Circuit has since rejected Mitchell, holding that
section 1505 does extend to investigations potentially leading to criminal
charges.64 Meanwhile, the only legislative history supporting the Higgins court’s
conclusion is a 1967 House Judiciary Committee report noting that “attempts to
obstruct a criminal investigation or inquiry before a proceeding has been initiated
are not within the proscription of [section 1505].”65 But again, the House
Judiciary Committee report does not speak to the question of when a
“proceeding” starts.
Despite its shaky foundations, Higgins has had a wide impact. A number
of other district courts have followed the decision.66 A Justice Department
manual instructs federal prosecutors to abide by it, telling them that
“investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are not section 1505
proceedings.”67 Indeed, in 2009, after federal prosecutors in Virginia won a
conviction under section 1505 for obstruction of an investigation by the FBI and
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the government confessed error and conceded
that the conviction should be vacated (as it was).68 Yet the Justice Department’s
practice with respect to section 1505 is far from consistent. At almost the exact
same time as the Virginia case, federal prosecutors in Missouri secured a 120month prison sentence for a defendant who had lied to FBI agents, on the theory
that his conduct violated section 1505.69 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld

63. United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (cited at Higgins, 511
F. Supp. at 456).
64. See United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting Mitchell). Of course, the Higgins court did not
know in 1981 that the Second Circuit would reject Mitchell a decade later.
65. H.R. REP. NO. 90-658, as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1760, 1760.
66. See United States v. McDaniel, No. 12-28, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110475, at *14 (N.D. Ga.
Jan. 29, 2013) (holding that an FBI investigation is “not a ‘proceeding’ under 18 U.S.C. § 1505”); United
States v. Edgemon, No. 95-43, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23820, at *18 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 1997)
(holding that a “mere criminal investigation” is “not a proceeding for purposes of § 1505”); United States
v. Wright, 704 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that obstruction of an investigation by the US
Attorney’s Office does not fall within the scope of section 1505 because the US Attorney “does not, to
this Court’s knowledge, have either rule-making or adjudicative authority”).
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL
§ 1727 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1727-protection-governmentprocesses-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1505 [https://perma.cc/TC7J-UV5H].
68. United States v. Adams, 335 F. App’x 338, 342–43 (4th Cir. 2009).
69. See United States v. Hayes, 329 F. App’x 680, 681 (8th Cir. 2009) (summarizing procedural
history). Hayes was convicted of violating the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006), but his
sentence was enhanced on grounds that his conduct also ran afoul of section 1505. See id.
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the sentence.70 Other circuits that have weighed in on the question have not
spoken with a single voice.71
It is hard to explain why section 1505 should apply to obstruction of an
investigation by the SEC or the FTC but not the FBI. The text of the statute does
not command that result, and logic does not recommend it. And yet a defendant
charged under section 1505 for obstructing a federal criminal investigation
would have a plausible argument that, in light of the muddled case law, the rule
of lenity weighs against applying the statute to his conduct.
But even if an FBI investigation does not come within the scope of section
1505, it might well fall within the scope of section 1512(c). That provision,
enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,72 makes it a crime to
corruptly obstruct, influence, or impede “any official proceeding.” The term
“official proceeding” is defined to mean any proceeding before a federal court
or grand jury, a proceeding before Congress, or “a proceeding before a Federal
Government agency which is authorized by law.”73 Section 1512 also states that
“an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time
of the offense.”74
There are two ways in which an FBI investigation might fall within the
scope of section 1512. First, an FBI investigation might be considered “a
proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by law.”
Federal law explicitly authorizes the FBI to “investigate any violation of Federal
criminal law involving Government officers and employees.”75 Obstruction of
an FBI investigation into official misconduct, then, might be considered
70. See id. While the Eighth Circuit did not squarely hold that section 1505 applies to FBI
investigations, it said instead that, “[t]o the extent [the defendant] argues that an FBI investigation is not
a ‘proceeding’ within the meaning of section 1505, we conclude any error was not plain because there
is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this court directly resolving the issue.” Id. (citation omitted)
(citing United States v. Higgins, 511 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1981)). In other words, because the
defendant had not preserved the issue below, he could not have his conviction overturned on those
grounds on appeal.
71. The D.C. Circuit has held that an investigation by the Inspector General’s office of the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) is a “proceeding” within the scope of section 1505
because the office “is charged with the duty of supervising investigations relating to the proper operation
of the agency” and because “the Inspector General is empowered to issue subpoenas and to compel
sworn testimony in conjunction with an investigation of agency activities.” See United States v. Kelley,
36 F.3d 1118, 1127 (1994). These factors distinguish the Inspector General’s office from the FBI, which
has subpoena authority only in a small set of cases: investigations of federal health care offenses, federal
offenses involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, and offenses related to controlled
substances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 876 (2018); 28 C.F.R. Pt. 0, Subpt.
R, App. (2018). The Sixth Circuit, meanwhile, has said that an investigation by the Food and Drug
Administration is a “proceeding” within the scope of section 1505 because “the FDA clearly possesses
‘enhanced’ investigative powers,” such as the power to inspect the premises of businesses regulated by
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act. See United States v. Pugh, 404 F. App’x 21, 26 (6th Cir. 2010).
72. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2018)).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2018).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2018).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 535(a) (2018).
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obstruction of an “official proceeding” within section 1512’s ambit. Some
federal courts have adopted the view that an FBI investigation is an “official
proceeding” under section 1512,76 though others have rejected it.77 Second,
obstruction of an FBI investigation that leads to a grand jury proceeding might
be construed as obstruction of the grand jury proceeding, which would bring it
within the scope of section 1512. Recall that an official proceeding “need not be
pending or about to be instituted” at the time of the section 1512 offense. The
relevant question under the case law is whether the official proceeding “was
foreseeable [to the defendant] when he engaged in the proscribed conduct.”78
Several federal courts have held that obstructing an FBI investigation that
foreseeably leads to a federal grand jury probe does fall within the scope of
section 1512.79
To sum up so far: Federal law, through three different statutes, makes it a
crime to “corruptly” obstruct, influence, or impede certain proceedings. Courts
have construed the actus reus requirement broadly to include any action or course
of action that obstructs justice. While much confusion has surrounded the mens
rea requirement, Congress’s intervention in 1996 clarifies that “corruptly” refers
to actions motivated by an “improper purpose.” And finally, while the outer
contours of the obstruction statutes’ scope are somewhat blurry, these statutes
clearly apply to obstruction of some federal agency investigations—and to
obstruction of federal criminal investigations under certain circumstances.
B. The President’s Role as Chief Law Enforcement Officer
We argued above that whether an act counts as obstruction of justice
depends on the legal role of the person who engages in the act. Because private
citizens do not have any formal role in the legal system, except when they are
jurors, any act by a private citizen to interfere with an investigation—including
destruction of documents and lying to investigators—will generally be
“improper” and thus “corrupt” for mens rea purposes. Public officials with
76. See, e.g., United States v. Plaskett, No. 2007-60, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62944, at *12 n.2
(D.V.I. Aug. 13, 2008) (“To the extent [defendant] argues that the federal agency investigation does not
constitute an official proceeding under Section 1512(c)(2), the Court is unpersuaded.”); United States v.
Hutcherson, No. 6:05CR00039, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48708, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 5, 2006)
(“Government agency actions, such as the FBI investigation of the defendant, are ‘official proceedings’
under Section 1512, whether or not a grand jury has been convened because Congress intended to deter
obstruction of more than judicial proceedings with Section 1512.”)
77. See United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that a
criminal investigation is not an ‘official proceeding’ under the obstruction of justice statute.”); United
States v. McDaniel, No. 2-12, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110475, at *6–13 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2013)
(collecting cases).
78. United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363, 378 (3d Cir. 2012); accord United States v.
Martinez, 862 F.3d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 2017) (government must prove that official proceeding was
“reasonably foreseeable to the defendant”).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, No. 08-224, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108387, at *15
(E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2009); see also United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 651–52 (1st Cir. 1996)
(reaching the same result under the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley version of section 1512).
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authority over law enforcement present a more complex situation. It is necessary
to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate acts that interfere with an
investigation.
The president has broad discretion over prosecutorial decisions, but the
exact breadth of this discretion has been a matter of controversy. The Vesting
Clause of Article II gives the president “[t]he executive Power,”80 and the Take
Care Clause instructs him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”81
Those provisions have been understood to give the president broad discretion
over prosecutorial decisions.82 But the Supreme Court has rarely weighed in. Its
most extensive treatment of the subject in recent decades came in the 1988 case
Morrison v. Olson, involving the now-lapsed independent counsel statute.83
Much of the discussion of presidential power over the last thirty years has taken
Morrison as its starting point,84 and so will we.
The story of Morrison starts with the Saturday Night Massacre of October
20, 1973. On that evening, President Nixon ordered his attorney general to fire
Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, who was then leading the investigation into
the Watergate scandal. The attorney general, Elliot Richardson, refused and
resigned, as did his deputy. Ultimately, it fell to the third in line at the Justice
Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork, to fire Cox.85
That episode contributed to Congress passing the Ethics in Government Act
of 1978,86 which limited the president’s power over certain prosecutions.87 One
provision of the statute created an independent counsel with authority to
investigate allegations of criminal behavior by executive branch officials,
including the president, and to bring criminal charges in court.88 Under the law,
the attorney general had the responsibility to request appointment of an
independent counsel upon receipt of evidence that a covered official had
committed a federal crime. Once the attorney general made that request, his
power over the investigation was sharply limited. Authority to appoint the

80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
81. Id. art. II, § 3.
82. See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (1986) (“The
power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to
see to the faithful execution of the laws . . . .”).
83. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 710 (1988) (explaining that the President’s
constitutionally assigned duties “include complete control over investigation and prosecution of
violations of the law.”).
84. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) (“We begin with the narrow but revealing question of criminal prosecution,
as presented in the contest over the independent counsel and resolved in Morrison v. Olson.”).
85. See Kenneth B. Noble, New Views Emerge of Bork’s Role in Watergate Dismissals, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/26/us/new-views-emerge-of-bork-s-role-inwatergate-dismissals.html [https://perma.cc/3X4H-LM9D].
86. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824.
87. Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court’s New Appointments
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 n.10 (1998).
88. Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. at 1867-73.
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independent counsel lay with a panel of federal judges, not the attorney general.
And under the version of the statute that existed at the time of Morrison, the
attorney general could remove the independent counsel only for good cause. The
president himself lacked the authority to remove the independent counsel or
otherwise intervene in the investigation.89
The immediate issue in the Morrison case involved an independent counsel
probe into whether a Justice Department official had committed obstruction or
other crimes in his testimony to a House subcommittee regarding certain EPA
documents. The broader question was whether the independent counsel statute
violated the constitutional separation of powers.90 The Court concluded that it
did not. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion acknowledged the
“undeniable” fact that the statute “reduces the amount of control or supervision
that the Attorney General and, through him, the President exercises over the
investigation and prosecution of a certain class of alleged criminal activity.”91
But in light of the attorney general’s role in initiating the independent counsel’s
investigation and his power to remove the independent counsel for good cause,
the Court said that the statute “give[s] the Executive Branch sufficient control
over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his
constitutionally assigned duties.”92
In a celebrated solo dissent, Justice Scalia charged that the majority in
Morrison had effected an “important change in the equilibrium of power” among
the branches.93 In his view, “the President’s constitutionally assigned duties
include complete control over investigation and prosecution of violations of the
law,”94 and the independent counsel statute deprived the president of that
authority. According to Justice Scalia, the Vesting Clause of Article II must be
read to give the president “not . . . some of the executive power, but all of the
executive power.”95 Since the conduct of criminal investigations and
prosecutions is a “purely” executive function, it cannot be assigned to anyone
other than the president himself.96 This view, according to which the president
alone “controls” law enforcement and hence cannot be forced to share that
function with other branches or autonomous bodies, is now known as the unitary
executive theory.97 For committed unitarians, Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent
is gospel.
89. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660–65 (1988) (summarizing statute).
90. See id. at 665–69.
91. Id. at 695.
92. Id. at 696.
93. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 710.
95. Id. at 705.
96. See id. at 705, 733–34.
97. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994) (defining the unitary executive theory as the view that the
“President must be able to control the execution of all federal laws”). While Calabresi and Prakash trace
the unitary executive theory back to the writings of Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, see id. at 605–
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Some commentators believe that the majority’s opinion in the case is
perhaps no longer good law.98 Indeed, the independent counsel statute upheld in
Morrison no longer is the law: a series of inquiries, culminating in the probe that
led to the impeachment of President Clinton, persuaded many people that the
independent counsel had grown too powerful. Congress decided to let the statute
lapse rather than renew it when it expired in 1999.99
While the rhetorical force of Scalia’s Morrison dissent is undeniable,100
even the staunchest advocates of the unitary executive theory understand that
Justice Scalia’s claim of “complete” presidential control over federal law
enforcement cannot be taken literally.101 Under the founding document,
Congress exerts control over law enforcement in numerous ways. The
president’s appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate, which means
that the president may not be able to appoint loyalists to carry out his priorities.
Congress defines most executive offices, which means that the president cannot
combine or divide offices in the way that best advances his goals. And Congress
holds the power of the purse, allowing it to threaten to withhold funds from
presidents who do not respect Congress’s enforcement preferences.102
Since the founding, Congress has imposed numerous additional constraints
on the president’s enforcement discretion. Civil service laws restrict the
president’s power to fire or punish lower-level subordinates who fail to carry out
his policies.103 Congress has created thousands of offices whose occupants are
protected by for-cause rules, and the Supreme Court has for the most part

06, the phrase itself was rarely used pre-Morrison. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies,
1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 58, 97 (discussing the concept of a “unitary executive”). For criticisms of the
unitary executive theory, see, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 84, at 2 (calling the theory a “myth”
that “ignores strong evidence that the framers imagined not a clear executive hierarchy with the President
at the summit, but a large degree of congressional power to structure the administration as it thought
proper”) (emphasis added); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State:
The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001).
98. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Morrison v. Olson Is Bad Law, LAWFARE (June 9, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/morrison-v-olson-bad-law [https://perma.cc/JMY4-GG6Q].
99. See Helen Dewar, Independent Counsel Law Is Set to Lapse, WASH. POST (June 5, 1999),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/counsels/stories/counsel060599.htm
[https://perma.cc/RKK4-K4KV].
100. See Justice Kagan and Judges Srinivasan and Kethledge Offer Views from the Bench,
STANFORD LAWYER No. 92, (Spring 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/justicekagan-and-judges-srinivasan-and-kethledge-offer-views-from-the-bench/
[https://perma.cc/E8DUL5PN] (quoting Justice Kagan as saying that Justice Scalia’s Morrison opinion is “one of the greatest
dissents ever written and every year it gets better”).
101. One account identifies three conditions of a unitary executive, which are fairly minimal:
“removal, a power to act in their stead, and a power to nullify their acts when the President disapproves.”
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 97, at 595 (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1992)).
102. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalor Prakash, A Critical Comment on the Constitutionality of
Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1155–56 (1999).
103. See Peter. L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law,
45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007).
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approved these actions despite the unitary executive theory.104 While Justice
Scalia saw the independent counsel statute as fundamentally altering the
interbranch equilibrium, a more accurate view is that the statute marked a modest
reduction in the president’s executive power, hardly detectable against the
background noise of countless adjustments to the scope of executive power over
the centuries.
Nor has anyone contended that the president can use any means to control
executive branch officials. It has never been suggested, as far as we know, that
the president enjoys the constitutional authority to reward and punish executive
branch officers by giving them bonuses or subjecting them to fines without
authorization from Congress. These types of rewards and punishments are
essential to control subordinates in the commercial world; yet the president
enjoys no constitutional entitlement to use them on his own subordinates. In
practice, then, the president’s ability to control his subordinates is limited.
The unitary executive theory also does not imply that the president can use
his executive power to pursue any ends. The president would commit treason if
he sought to stop an investigation in order to prevent the unmasking of an enemy
spy in a time of war. The president would commit bribery if he called off an
investigation in exchange for a payment from a suspect. This much is apparent
from the fact that treason and bribery are impeachable offenses and from the fact
that the Impeachment Judgment Clause clearly contemplates the possibility of
prosecuting a former president for offenses that led to his removal.105
The president’s enforcement discretion is limited by law in other ways as
well. Congress can compel executive officials to regulate106 and to enforce

104. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–29, 632 (1935) (holding that
Congress may restrict the power of the president to remove officers of independent agencies).
105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust
or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”) (emphasis added). One might also
argue that explicit immunity provisions elsewhere in the Constitution imply that the president is not
immune from criminal liability for offenses committed while in office. The Constitution provides that
senators and representatives cannot be arrested—except for treason and breach of the peace—while
attending or traveling to or from a legislative session, and it grants them immunity for anything said in
a speech or debate in the Senate or House. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Then-Solicitor General
Robert Bork concluded in a 1973 memo that “[s]ince the Framers knew how to, and did, spell out an
immunity, the natural inference is that no immunity exists where none is mentioned.” See Mem. for the
United States Concerning the Vice President’s Claim of Constitutional Immunity 5, In re Proceedings
of the Grand Jury Impaneled December 5, 1972, Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the
United States, No. 73-965 (D. Md. filed Oct. 5, 1973), reprinted in Eric M. Freedman, On Protecting
Accountability, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 775, 779 (1999).
106. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury
v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
253, 276 (2003) (explaining that Congress “sometimes assigns administrative agencies the task of
adopting rules, regulations, standards, or guidelines to specify and implement Congress’s general
objectives.”).
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noncriminal statutes,107 and the courts can issue injunctions against executive
branch officials and hold them in contempt if they disobey those commands.108
Whether the courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the president in his official
capacity is less clear.109 The issue arises rarely, however, because most laws are
enforced by executive branch officials at or below the cabinet level rather than
by the president himself. There are also background constitutional norms and
procedural protections, including due process and recourse to habeas corpus, that
operate as limits on presidential action.110
At the same time, it is widely accepted that the president has authority to
refuse to enforce the law under certain circumstances. The president can very
likely refuse to defend a law that he believes to be unconstitutional in court,111
and he can probably refuse to enforce a law against violators on grounds of
unconstitutionality as well.112 He can definitely allocate enforcement resources
across laws (voting rights laws versus corporate fraud laws), or types of law
enforcement (prosecution of drug kingpins versus drug users).113 He can set
priorities and areas of focus. He may be able to refuse to enforce certain laws
wholesale merely because he disapproves of them on policy grounds, though this
is the subject of heated and inconclusive debate.114 The extent of his discretion

107. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 266–67 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (granting a writ of
mandamus against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission instructing it to comply with an act of
Congress).
108. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 707–08 (2018).
109. The Supreme Court has said that it “has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1992) (quoting
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1867)). It has also held that as a matter of statutory
interpretation, the president is not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, which constrains
subordinate executive branch officials. See id. at 796. But it has “left open the question of whether the
President might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance of a purely ‘ministerial’
duty,” and it has said that the president is not entirely immune from criminal process. See id. at 802.
110. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (“The habeas court must have
sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s
power to detain.”).
111. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congresslitigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [https://perma.cc/P6QR-A9D4] (informing Speaker Boehner
that President Obama determined that the Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional and that
Department of Justice attorneys would no longer defend the constitutionality of the statute in court).
112. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Frank
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 920–24 (1990)).
113. See Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect
Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489, 515–16 (2017).
114. Compare Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1052
(2013) (arguing that “the President acts permissibly when he uses enforcement discretion and
prioritization—including non-enforcement—to advance policy goals, but only if he can articulate a
reasonable statutory basis to the public and to Congress for his decisions”), with Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit
K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2014)
(arguing that presidential non-enforcement to advance policy goals violates the “core principle” that “no
branch should be allowed to dictate policy for the whole nation”).
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will likely depend on whether we are talking about civil law or criminal law, and
whether or not Congress has tried to constrain him.115
The ambiguity of the limits on the president’s enforcement power reflect
an uneasy compromise among constantly evolving policy considerations. The
enforcement power must be, to a large degree, discretionary because of the
nature of our legal system. Congress has passed many more laws than could be
enforced in a mechanical way, and there does not seem to be any neutral,
judicially enforceable standard for allocating enforcement resources among
laws. Once it is recognized that law enforcement must be discretionary, the
normative question about whether executive branch officials should exercise
discretion is settled. Is implies ought. But theorists have made a virtue of this
necessity. They argue that because the president sits atop the executive, and is
subject to electoral constraints, he is the best person to bear the responsibility of
enforcing the law in the public interest.116 There is also the concern that if
Congress can constrain the president’s enforcement power, the president would
not serve as a check on legislative tyranny.117
The countervailing worry is that the president may abuse his enforcement
discretion. Of course, it was this worry—which seemed more than justified in
the wake of Watergate—that led to the enactment of the independent counsel
statute in the first place. But concerns about abuse of power extend beyond
narrow cases of self-dealing and protection of political allies. Democrats argued
that President Reagan exceeded his executive authority by failing to enforce
environmental laws,118 and—two decades later—that President George W. Bush
stretched the limits of his constitutional power through lackluster enforcement
of civil rights statutes.119 Republicans argued that President Obama violated the
Take Care Clause by failing to deport large classes of undocumented immigrants
after Congress rejected a law that would have given them a path to citizenship.120
Critics of executive power worry that if the president’s enforcement discretion
is truly plenary, then he can effectively veto laws that he does not like—at least,
for the duration of the administration—even if an actual veto has been
115. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .”).
116. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728–29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the
primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a political one” and that concentrating executive power in
the president maximizes political accountability).
117. See id. at 713–14.
118. See Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1125–30
(2015) (summarizing debate over Reagan administration nonenforcement).
119. See Goodwin Liu, The Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 81–82 (2009).
120. See Brief of Governor Abbott, Governor Bentley, Governor Christie, Governor Daugaard,
Governor Martinez & Governor Walker as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, United States
v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674) (arguing that the president’s Deferred Action for Parental
Accountability (DAPA) rule constitutes “an unconstitutional dispensation of the [Immigration and
Nationality Act] under the Take Care Clause”).
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overridden.121 Such a view may seem inconsistent with the text of the
Constitution, which gives primary policy-making authority to Congress. It is
even more clearly inconsistent with the goals of the Founders, who rejected a
proposal to give the president “dispensing” power—the power to suspend laws—
which was a controversial feature of the British king’s executive power before
the Glorious Revolution.122
Hence the dialectic between power and constraint. The president should
enjoy some core discretionary power, but he cannot go too far.123 Obama-era
controversies—especially involving immigration nonenforcement—clarified the
stakes of the conflict but failed to resolve it.124 What some saw as a justifiable
exercise of discretion in response to congressional gridlock,125 others saw as a
potentially impeachable offense.126
The unresolved debate over presidential enforcement runs parallel to
arguments regarding the discretionary power of lower-level prosecutors. Courts
sometimes say that federal prosecutors, or the attorney general, enjoy absolute
discretion to decide whether to pursue charges in criminal cases.127 But such
claims are overbroad. The courts have acknowledged that constitutional

121. Markowitz, supra note 113, at 492 (“Taken to its extreme, the power not to enforce could
act as a constitutionally suspect second veto for a broad swath of legislation.”).
122. See Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack upon the Royal
Dispensing Power 1597–1689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 198–99 (1985) (describing the crown’s
dispensing power).
123. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1711 (2004) (“Courts should review those claims that challenge
particular nonenforcement decisions for lack of adequate explanation tending to indicate the absence of
relevant factors or the presence of impermissible ones . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy of Discretion: Refining the Legality Debate About
Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2015) (identifying “five
different types of presidential discretion” exercised by the Obama administration in the immigration
context).
125. See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence
of Immigration Reform, 116 W.VA. L. REV. 255 (2013).
126. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Opinion, Why Congress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/opinion/the-impeachment-of-obama-on-immigrationmay-be-legal-but-its-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/V96W-4A8L] (suggesting that President Obama’s
“overreaching” may “constitute an ‘impeachable offense’ under the constitutional standard,” though
adding that impeachment would be normatively undesirable even if legally justifiable).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their
control over criminal prosecutions.”). See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)
(quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not
to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his
discretion.”); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967) (citations omitted) (“The
discretion of the Attorney General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon
a prosecution already started, is absolute.”); Shade v. Department of Transportation, 394 F. Supp 1237,
1241 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (citations omitted) (“[T]he discretion to choose which statute to prosecute under
is vested in the prosecuting attorney.”).
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limitations, including due process, apply to prosecutorial discretion.128 For
example, the Supreme Court has declared that the prosecutor must be
“disinterested.”129 Numerous cases confirm that the principle of prosecutorial
discretion does not entitle the prosecutor to bring charges when he has a conflict
of interest.130 Likewise, constitutional tort claims can be brought against
prosecutors for extreme abuses of prosecutorial discretion, such as agreeing to
drop cases in return for bribes or sexual favors, or demanding that a defendant
swear a religious oath.131
It is true that complaints about abuse of prosecutorial discretion typically
lead to judicial remedies when prosecutors bring cases, not when they refuse to
bring cases. For obvious reasons, criminal defendants never try to persuade a
court to compel the prosecutor to bring charges against other people, in order to
produce equality of outcomes but not an outcome desired by the defendant. The
pattern might cause one to think that the law gives more freedom to prosecutors
not to bring cases than to bring cases. But the law has never been defined this
way.132 The pattern reflects a remedial asymmetry. When a defendant complains
about a prosecutor’s bias, a court can easily offer a remedy by releasing the
defendant or ordering the prosecutor off the case. When a prosecutor’s bias
results in a failure to bring a case, it is harder for the court to do anything about
it. Judges, as they have recognized, are in a poor position to order prosecutors to
bring cases, as it would require them to supervise the case and ensure that the
prosecutor did not skimp on effort or resources.133 But this asymmetry does not
mean that a biased prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is lawful; rather, it is
illegal but hard to remedy.134
With respect to the scope of the president’s enforcement discretion, these
precedents involving lower-level prosecutors are instructive, but they are not
determinative. One can certainly argue that the president, given the greater
breadth of his portfolio and his more direct accountability to the electorate, ought
to have wider discretion over enforcement decisions than a lower-level
prosecutor. Roger Taney, who would eventually serve as chief justice of the
128. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)).
129. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
130. See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that the prosecutor’s
conflict of interest “violate[d] the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
131. See, e.g., Bernard v. Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 504 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Schloss v. Bouse, 876
F.2d 287, 291–92 (2nd Cir. 1989); Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1210 (2d Cir. 1996)).
132. The law, 28 U.S.C. § 528, and DOJ regulations do not make this distinction but forbid any
kind of conflict of interest, regardless of its effect on prosecutors’ decisions.
133. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (“Judicial deference to the decisions of these executive officers
rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts.”).
134. The proposition that prosecutorial conduct may be illegal but irremediable is often stated by
courts considering claims of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d
783, 791 (11th Cir. 1988) (doctrine of prosecutorial immunity applies even when prosecutor engages in
unlawful conduct).
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Supreme Court and ensure his infamy as the author of the Dred Scott decision,
articulated an early version of this argument while he was President Jackson’s
attorney general.135 President Jackson had directed a federal prosecutor to drop
a controversial case involving jewels stolen from a Dutch princess. The secretary
of state asked the attorney general whether the president’s action was lawful. In
his Jewels of the Princess Orange opinion, Taney concluded that it was. While
conceding that it would have been improper for the prosecutor to dismiss the
case on his own,136 Taney said that it was “within the legitimate power of the
President to direct [the prosecutor] to institute or to discontinue a pending
suit . . . whenever the interest of the United States is directly or indirectly
concerned.”137
Yet notably, neither Taney in Jewels of the Princess Orange nor Scalia in
Morrison argued that the president’s prosecutorial discretion grants him the
power to pursue or drop a case for any reason whatsoever.138 Other advocates of
the unitary executive theory do not make that claim either, and such an argument
would be inconsistent with the constitutional framework. As we have observed
above, the founders explicitly stated that the laws against treason and bribery
would apply to the president, and that the president might be prosecuted after
impeachment and removal for committing those offenses while in office. And as
Gary McDowell has noted,139 the Constitution’s framers were familiar with Sir
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which listed
“obstructing the execution of lawful process” as a “very high” offense against
“public justice.”140 Against this backdrop, the constitutional reference to “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” seems even more clearly to suggest that the crime
of obstruction would apply to the president. At the same time, as the analysis
above illustrates, the obstruction of justice laws cannot be applied to the
president without some accommodation for his unique role in the constitutional
scheme. Fortunately for lawyers and lawmakers today who are faced with the
task of reconciling the obstruction statutes with the president’s prosecutorial

135. The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482 (1831).
136. See id. at 490 (stating “the prosecution must go on, even if, in point of fact, it is groundless
and unjust, unless the President may lawfully interfere, and authorize and direct the district attorney to
strike it off”).
137. Id. at 492; see also Andrias, supra note 114, at 1052 (stating that Taney’s opinion “illustrates
the degree to which enforcement decisions regarding the most pressing issues facing the country have
been thought to be at the core of the President’s authority and responsibility”).
138. Justice Scalia suggested that the foreign relations consequences of a law enforcement action
should be relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But while he said that such considerations
could be considered “political,” he emphasized that they were political “in the nonpartisan sense.” See
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 708 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, even Justice Scalia appeared
to accept the proposition that intervening in an investigation for partisan purposes would be improper.
139. Gary L. McDowell, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: Recovering the Intentions of the
Founders, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 626, 641 (1999).
140. IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 86 (Ruth Paley ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
2016) (1765–69) (emphases omitted).
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powers, several decades of historical precedents provide helpful guidance as they
contemplate this challenge.
C. Historical Precedents
The obstruction allegations against President Trump do not present the first
time in modern American history that a sitting president or high-ranking White
House official has been accused of obstruction. In this section we review four
previous episodes involving accusations of obstruction by the president or his
closest advisors: the Watergate scandal, the Iran-Contra affair, the impeachment
of Bill Clinton, and the controversy over the firing of nine US attorneys in 2006.
These episodes provide support for the notions that a president who uses his
position of power to obstruct a federal investigation or proceeding commits an
impeachable offense, and that interference in a criminal investigation for partisan
advantage falls within the definition of obstruction.
1. Watergate
The first sitting president to face serious allegations of obstruction was
Richard Nixon, who was accused of interfering with the FBI’s investigation into
the break-in at the Democratic National Committee’s Watergate headquarters.
The first article of impeachment reported out by the House Judiciary Committee
in July 1974 charged that Nixon had “prevented, obstructed, and impeded the
administration of justice” through (among other means) “endeavouring to
interfere with the conduct of investigations” by the Justice Department and the
FBI and “endeavouring to misuse the Central Intelligence Agency.”141 The
“smoking gun” in the Watergate scandal was a tape-recorded conversation from
June 1972 in which Nixon and his chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, concocted a
plan to instruct the deputy chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to tell
the FBI director to call off the bureau’s probe into the Watergate burglary.142
The vote on the first article of impeachment was 27-11, with six
Republicans joining all twenty-one of the Committee’s Democrats in the
majority.143 After Nixon’s resignation, however, all eleven Republicans who
voted against the first article of impeachment submitted a statement
acknowledging that, in light of subsequent revelations, they believed that Nixon
had committed obstruction.144 Nixon himself, while contesting the factual
allegations against him, acknowledged at a press conference prior to leaving
office that “of course, the crime of obstruction of justice is a serious crime and

141.
142.

RODINO, supra note 3, at 2.
Andrew Martin, The Smoking Gun that Took Down Nixon: One from the History Books,
BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-16/the-smokinggun-that-took-down-nixon-one-from-the-history-books [https://perma.cc/HL99-F84F].
143. RODINO, supra note 3, at 10.
144. Id. at 361 (statement of Representative Hutchinson et al.); see also id. at 493 (statement of
Representative Mayne).
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would be an impeachable offense.”145 Thus, while the Watergate affair did not
result in a judicial ruling or a precedent of the full House or Senate to the effect
that the crime of obstruction applies to presidential interference in a federal
criminal investigation, the episode did reveal a bipartisan consensus—with
which Nixon himself concurred—that the president did not stand above the
obstruction laws.
There is a subtle question as to whether the Nixon case supports the view
that the president can commit a crime of obstruction of justice or rather that
obstruction by the president is a political offense that may justify impeachment
but not indictment. The eleven Republican minority members of the House
Judiciary Committee who initially voted against impeachment but subsequently
switched their views on the first article made clear that they took the former
position: Nixon, in their final analysis, violated the criminal obstruction
statutes.146 One member who voted in favor of impeachment likewise voiced the
view that Nixon’s obstruction was not only impeachable but also criminal.147
An alternative approach to the question of whether Nixon’s obstruction was
a crime is to imagine what would have happened if Ford had not pardoned Nixon:
would he have been convicted of obstruction? Probably. The pardon itself
implies that Ford believed that Nixon faced criminal liability of some sort, but
we do not know whether Nixon would have faced criminal liability for
obstruction of justice or for other offenses. At a minimum though, we know that
at least a dozen members of the House Judiciary Committee did believe that a
president could commit the crime of obstruction. That is one point in favor of the
view that obstruction laws apply to the president, though it falls well short of
resolving the matter.
2. Iran-Contra
In November 1986, news broke that Reagan administration officials had
facilitated the sale of weapons to the Iranian government and used some of the

145. The President’s News Conference (Mar. 6, 1974), in THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4377
[https://perma.cc/LV3X-77DB].
146. The minority members concluded:
We recognize that the majority of the Committee, as well as its Special Counsel, apparently
do not consider it necessary or appropriate to charge impeachable offenses in terms of the
violation of specific Federal criminal statutes, such as Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy),
§ 1001 (false statements to a government agency), or §§ 1503, 1505 and 1510 (obstruction
of justice) . . . . We disagree. To the contrary, we believe the evidence warrants the
conclusion that the President did conspire with a number of his aides and subordinates to
delay, impede and obstruct the investigation of the Watergate affair by the Department of
Justice.
RODINO, supra note 3, at 382 (statement of Representative Hutchinson et al.).
147. See Debate on Articles of Impeachment: Hearings of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., at 307 (1974) (statement of Rep. Railsback). It is not clear whether others who voted
for the first article shared Representative Railsback’s view.
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proceeds to finance the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, notwithstanding a
congressional prohibition on aid to the Contras. Two Reagan administration
officials—National Security Advisor John Poindexter and National Security
Council staffer Oliver North—would be convicted of obstructing a congressional
inquiry into the Iran-Contra affair, but their convictions would later be
vacated.148 A third official, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, was
indicted for obstruction of justice in 1992 but pardoned by then-President George
H.W. Bush before going to trial.149
During his investigation of the Iran-Contra affair, Independent Counsel
Lawrence Walsh considered whether obstruction charges should be filed against
President Reagan. Walsh ultimately decided not to pursue the charges,
explaining that “the fundamental reason for lack of prosecutorial effort was the
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the President knew that the
statements being made to Congress were false, or that acts of obstruction were
being committed by Poindexter, North and others.”150 Walsh also considered
obstruction charges against Edwin Meese, who served as attorney general under
President Reagan from 1985 to 1988. Again, Walsh declined to prosecute Meese
because of insufficient evidence, not because of any view that the attorney
general’s prosecutorial discretion made him immune from obstruction
liability.151 Walsh added in his final report that the criminal investigation of
George H.W. Bush—who served as vice president under Reagan and then
succeeded him as president—was “regrettably incomplete.”152
The Iran-Contra affair differs from Watergate in an important respect: the
obstruction allegations involved obstruction of congressional inquiries, and since
the president does not have prosecutorial discretion with respect to congressional
probes, the difficult questions concerning presidential obstruction that arise with
respect to executive branch investigations did not come up. But most important
for our purposes, the Watergate-era view that the president can commit
obstruction does not appear to have been weakened.
3. The Impeachment of Bill Clinton
In December 1998, Bill Clinton became just the second president in
American history to be impeached. One of the two articles of impeachment
reported out of the House charged the president with obstruction of justice. The
specific allegations in the House impeachment report were that Clinton
148. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Poindexter, 951
F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
149. See Walter Pincus, Bush Pardons Weinberger in Iran-Contra Affair, WASH. POST (Dec. 25
1992), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/28/AR2006032800858.html
[https://perma.cc/ZBR6-B3BX].
150. LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS: INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 465 (1993).
151. Id. at ch. 31.
152. Id. at ch. 28.
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encouraged former White House intern Monica Lewinsky and Oval Office
secretary Betty Currie to give false testimony in a sexual harassment lawsuit
against him, that he allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements
to a federal judge in the harassment suit, and that he lied to aides about his
relationship with Lewinsky knowing that the aides would repeat those lies to a
federal grand jury.153
The impeachment of President Clinton was controversial in many respects,
and the Senate ultimately split 50–50 on the article of impeachment charging
obstruction. Yet at no point during the impeachment proceedings was there
debate as to whether presidential obstruction could be an impeachable offense or
whether a president could be charged criminally for obstruction following
removal. The House Judiciary Committee’s report said that the first article of
impeachment against Nixon had established a “clear precedent” that a president
who used his position of power to obstruct the administration of justice
committed an impeachable offense.154 The Judiciary Committee report also
concluded that Clinton’s obstruction of a pending federal judicial proceeding
was a crime within the scope of section 1503.155 Democrats on the House
Judiciary Committee disputed the factual allegations against Clinton but did not
dispute the majority’s claim that presidential obstruction is a potentially
impeachable and criminal offense.156
The view that presidential obstruction is both impeachable and criminal
emerges even more clearly from the Senate proceedings. The trial memorandum
submitted by the House to the Senate argued that President Clinton’s conduct
“might easily have been charged under [the obstruction] statutes.”157 President
Clinton’s brief to the Senate also acknowledged section 1503 as providing the
“applicable law.”158 Senators from both parties, including supporters and
opponents of Clinton’s removal, recognized in floor statements that section 1503
applied to the president (though they disagreed as to whether the president had
violated the provision).159 A letter from more than 430 law professors opposing
impeachment nonetheless agreed that “obstructing justice can without doubt be

153. IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. REP. NO. 105-830, at 63–74 (1998).
154. Id. at 119.
155. See id. at 64, 120–21.
156. See id. at 243–57 (minority views).
157. Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of President William
Jefferson Clinton, S. DOC. NO. 106-4, at 813 (1999) (Trial Mem. of the U.S. House of Representatives).
158. See id. at 961.
159. See S. DOC. NO. 106–4, at 2580 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“If your aim is to respect the rule
of law, you must also respect the rules of law—the precise legal definitions of the crimes, as found
in . . . 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1512, the applicable Federal obstruction of justice statutes”); id. at 2596–
97 (statement of Sen. Frist); id. at 2780 (statement of Sen. Thompson); id. at 2926–27 (statement of Sen.
Feingold); id. at 3077 (statement of Sen. Hatch); id. at 3113 (statement of Sen. Reed).
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impeachable” as well as criminal.160 The professors argued that “making false
statements about sexual improprieties is not a sufficient constitutional basis to
justify the trial and removal from office of the President of the United States,”
but they emphasized that—by contrast—a “President who corruptly used the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to obstruct an investigation would have
criminally exercised his presidential powers.”161
As in Iran-Contra, most of the presidential obstruction questions in the
Clinton case did not involve the same questions of prosecutorial discretion that
we discuss in Part I.B. The allegations against Clinton centered around
obstruction of the administration of justice in a civil proceeding initiated by a
private citizen, rather than interference with an executive branch investigation.
Insofar as Clinton obstructed a grand jury inquiry, it was the independent
counsel—and not a prosecutor under the president’s control—who was
spearheading the investigation. Nonetheless, we think it relevant that Clinton’s
accusers and defenders both accepted the proposition that a president who uses
his position of power to obstruct an investigation thereby commits an
impeachable offense and a crime.
4. Dismissal of US Attorneys Under George W. Bush
The dismissal of nine US attorneys by President George W. Bush in 2006
provided the most recent occasion (prior to Trump’s tenure) for considering the
interaction between prosecutorial discretion and criminal obstruction. The most
controversial of these was the dismissal of David Iglesias as the US attorney for
the District of New Mexico.162 According to a subsequent Justice Department
report, several New Mexico Republicans had pressured Iglesias to investigate
voter fraud allegations more aggressively and to bring an indictment against
former Democratic State Senator Manny Aragon prior to the November 2006
election. In December of that year, after Iglesias had failed to bring charges
against the Democratic politician, a senior official in the Bush administration
Justice Department asked Iglesias to resign. Iglesias stepped down later that
month. The acting US attorney who replaced Iglesias brought charges against
Aragon in March of the following year.163
In September 2008, the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector
General and Office of Professional Responsibility released a report on the firing
of Iglesias and the eight other US attorneys. The report recommended the

160. Bernard J. Hibbitts, More than 430 Law Professors Send Letter to Congress Opposing
Impeachment,
JURIST
(Nov.
6,
1998),
https://web.archive.org/web/19990128143405/http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/petit1.htm
[https://perma.cc/VD4T-5SSX] (reproducing letter).
161. Id.
162. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 42 (2008).
163. See id. at 155–86.
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appointment of a special counsel to investigate the Iglesias firing more fully.164
The report went on to say:
While we found no case charging a violation of the obstruction of justice
statute involving an effort to accelerate a criminal prosecution for
partisan political purposes, we believe that pressuring a prosecutor to
indict a case more quickly to affect the outcome of an upcoming election
could be a corrupt attempt to influence the prosecution in violation of
the obstruction of justice statute. The same reasoning could apply to
pressuring a prosecutor to take partisan political considerations into
account in his charging decisions in voter fraud matters.165
Then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed a federal prosecutor
from Connecticut to conduct an investigation into Iglesias’s firing. The special
prosecutor’s investigation ended in 2010 without any criminal charges being
filed. A letter from the Justice Department to the chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee relayed the special prosecutor’s conclusion that the evidence was
“insufficient to establish an attempt to pressure Mr. Iglesias to accelerate his
charging decisions.”166
The Iglesias episode is likely to go down in history as a footnote. But even
as a footnote, it supports an important proposition: at least in the view of the
Justice Department, public officials can commit the crime of obstruction not just
by thwarting an investigation for political reasons but by propelling an
investigation forward for political ends.167
D. Synthesizing the Obstruction Statutes and Article II
The primary challenge in applying the obstruction statutes to the president
comes in defining the mens rea of “corruptly” in a manner that respects the
president’s role as the head of the executive branch. Recall that Congress and the
courts have construed “corruptly” to refer to “improper purpose.”168 The
president does not act corruptly when his actions follow from a good faith effort
to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. For example, if the president
interferes with an investigation because he thinks it might reveal the identity of
an undercover intelligence operative abroad, or because he worries it might bring

164. Id. at 198.
165. Id. at 199.
166. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legislative
Affairs, to Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives (July 21, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/conyers.dannehy.ola.resp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RLM9-23B6].
167. It might seem odd to say that advancing an investigation could be an obstruction of justice.
One possible interpretation of this view is that bringing a case that was not justified interferes with the
“due administration of justice” because it could result in a wrongful conviction. Another interpretation
is that the obstruction consists of bringing a case before it was ready, risking the acquittal of a guilty
party in order to obtain the short-term political advantage of a public indictment shortly before an
election (rather than a conviction after it).
168. See supra note 50.
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us to the brink of war with a hostile nation, his actions follow from an appropriate
conception of his commander-in-chief responsibilities and so cannot constitute
obstruction. So too, when the president intervenes because he believes that an
investigation amounts to a waste of scarce enforcement resources, his actions
follow from his responsibilities under the Take Care Clause and are likewise
noncriminal.169
Moreover, the president need not justify each exercise of prosecutorial
discretion by drawing a link back to a particular provision of Article II. As the
Supreme Court noted in the 1996 case of United States v. Armstrong:
The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad
discretion to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws. They have this latitude
because they are designated by statute as the President’s delegates to
help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.” As a result, the presumption of
regularity supports their prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly
discharged their official duties.170
If the presumption of regularity attaches to the prosecutorial decisions of
the attorney general and the US attorneys because they are the president’s
delegates, then that presumption applies to the prosecutorial decisions of the
president as well. But the presumption of regularity is not irrebuttable.171 That
is, one begins from the premise that the president intervened in the investigation
to carry out his Article II responsibilities, and one usually ends there—but not
always.
When might a president’s intervention in an investigation or other
proceeding overcome the presumption of regularity? The Justice Department’s
regulations for prosecutors provide a starting point for thinking about this
problem. They forbid a prosecutor to take part in an investigation where she has
a “personal or political relationship” with the subject or someone connected with
the investigation.172 Personal relationship “means a close and substantial
connection of the type normally viewed as likely to induce partiality,”173 such as
a “relationship with . . . father, mother, brother, sister, child and spouse.”174

169. Cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The
power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive’s duty to
see to the faithful execution of the laws . . . .”).
170. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations and some internal quotation
marks omitted).
171. Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the presumption may be
overcome, for example, by showing that the official actions were “in violation of prescribed
procedures”).
172. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(a) (2018). The regulation is authorized by a statute that directs the attorney
general to disqualify Justice Department employees from cases in which they have conflicts of interest.
28 U.S.C. § 528 (2018).
173. Id. § 45.2(c)(2).
174. Id.
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Political relationship means “a close identification with an elected official, a
candidate (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party,
or a campaign organization.”175 Involvement in investigations where the
prosecutor has a personal or political relationship with the target is improper
because the prosecutor will be tempted to interfere with the normal course of law
enforcement.176 These regulations operate against the backdrop of a federal
conflict of interest statute that imposes criminal penalties177 upon federal officers
and employees who “participate[] personally” in matters in which they, their
spouses, or their minor children have a “financial interest.”178
While these regulations for prosecutors provide a starting point, the
president’s role differs in several ways—two of which suggest that the president
should be given more freedom than prosecutors have. First, the president has a
political relationship with many more people, including almost every major
official in the executive branch and every important member of his party. If the
obstruction statutes are applied to the president, he must recuse himself from
countless investigations where there may be a valid public reason to intervene.
Second, the president, unlike a prosecutor, is responsible for national security,
public order, and other important areas of national life, and plays a significant
role in setting public policy. He therefore needs flexibility to block investigations
that interfere with the broad public interest.
Yet, there are two countervailing factors that suggest a president should
have less freedom than prosecutors have. First, the president is almost never
directly involved in an investigation. Because of the nature of his position, he
does not have the time or inclination; typically, he takes part in law enforcement
by setting priorities and appointing officials to oversee the process.179 While he
needs to have the freedom to set priorities, he can also often recuse himself from
individual investigations without sacrificing too much executive authority.
175. Id.
176. See id. § 45.2(b). If an employee’s supervisor determines that the employee has a personal
or political relationship with the person under investigation, the employee may not participate in the
investigation unless the supervisor determines that the relationship will not affect the impartiality of the
employee’s service and that “[t]he employee’s participation would not create an appearance of a conflict
of interest.”
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2018) (violators subject to penalties under § 216). Cf. 18 U.S.C.
§ 216(a)(2) (2018) (penalty of up to five years imprisonment for willful violation).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a). Note that the definition of “officer” here does not include the president,
vice president, members of Congress, or federal judges. See 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2018).
179. A recent example is the different approaches to drug law enforcement of the Obama and
Trump administrations. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR
ALL FEDERAL PROSECUTORS: DEPARTMENT CHARGING AND SENTENCING POLICY (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download
[https://perma.cc/7EQW-EMAF]
(instructing prosecutors to “charge and pursue the most serious provable offense,” and thereby maximize
criminal penalties); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR
ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6ZT3JGV] (instructing Department of Justice employees to leave enforcement of low-level marijuana
offenses to local authorities).
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Second, the president has immensely more power than an ordinary prosecutor
and is subject to fewer bureaucratic constraints. If the president abuses his power,
he can do much more harm than any prosecutor can.
Thus, while an argument could be made that the president obstructs justice
whenever he interferes with an investigation in a way that is not consistent with
his constitutional and legal role, this seems to us too broad because the outer
limits of the president’s authority are ambiguous and subject to disagreement. A
more sensible approach would be to apply the obstruction statutes narrowly to
cases where there is no serious claim that the president’s motive is consistent
with his public role. The presumption of regularity would apply except when the
president seeks to advance interests that are narrowly personal (e.g., the wellbeing of family members), pecuniary (e.g., the procurement of a bribe), or
partisan (e.g., winning the next election or aiding the electoral prospects of a
party member).
This conclusion is informed not only by the ethical and legal guidelines
applicable to prosecutors, but also by structural inferences drawn from the
Constitution. For example, the founders acknowledged the impropriety of a
public official participating in a proceeding in which he has a personal stake:
hence the rule that the chief justice, rather than the vice president, presides over
the Senate trial of an impeached president.180 The vice president—who normally
presides over the Senate181—would have an obvious personal stake in the
president’s trial, because the vice president is next in the order of succession.
The founders also included a number of constitutional provisions designed to
combat financial conflicts of interest, including the Ineligibility Clause182 and
the Foreign183 and Domestic Emoluments Clauses.184 And while the Constitution
does not specifically regulate the use of public office for partisan purposes, that
is probably because the Founders envisioned a republic without parties.

180. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
181. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been
increased during such time . . . .”). Thus, if Congress votes to raise the pay of a federal office, no member
of Congress can serve in that office until after the end of her term.
183. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o person holding any office of profit or trust under [the United
States], shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present [or] Emolument . . . of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”). For further discussion, see generally Amandeep S.
Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639 (2017); and
John Mikhail, The Definition of ‘Emolument’ in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806
(July 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995693 [https://perma.cc/AZ9XE5JQ].
184. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President . . . shall not receive . . . any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.”). On the Ineligibility and Emoluments Clauses as
anti-conflict-of-interest provisions, see generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 341, 358–62 (2009).
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Believing parties to be a “political evil,”185 they certainly would have thought it
improper for the president to use his position of power in pursuit of narrowly
partisan ends.
Translating these structural inferences into a legal standard for presidential
obstruction of justice is not an entirely straightforward exercise. But this is
precisely the exercise that a court would have to undertake in the event that a
president (or former president) is prosecuted on charges that he committed
obstruction while in office. We suggest that the following standard best
synthesizes the legal materials we have examined: A president commits
obstruction of justice when he significantly interferes with an investigation,
prosecution, or other law enforcement action to advance narrowly personal,
pecuniary, or partisan interests. He does not, however, commit obstruction when
he acts on the basis of a legitimate and good faith conception of his constitutional
responsibilities, even if he receives a personal or pecuniary benefit or
incidentally advances his party’s interests.186
We address questions of mixed motives at greater length in Part II.A. For
now, let us define some of the terms. “Significant interference” means a direct
order to a responsible subordinate (like an FBI agent or Justice Department
lawyer) to drop an investigation, prosecution, or other law enforcement activity,
or to ensure that it is not completed to professional standards. Significant
interference could also take place less directly—for example, by conveying the
order through intermediaries. And significant interference need not be limited to
thwarting an investigation: a president might interfere with an investigation, we
suppose, by ordering a subordinate to bring an indictment against a political

185. Letter from John Adams to Jonathan Jackson (Oct. 2, 1780), in IX THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS 511 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, Brown & Co., 1854).
186. After we posted a draft of this Article on the Social Science Research Network, law
professors Alan Dershowitz and Josh Blackman both argued that a president cannot be prosecuted for
obstruction of justice if his actions are constitutionally authorized. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Opinion,
No One Is Above the Law, HILL (Dec. 5, 2017), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/363387-no-one-isabove-the-law [https://perma.cc/6V4B-5229] (“My argument . . . is not that a president can never be
charged with obstruction of justice. It is that he cannot be charged with that crime if his only actions
were constitutionally authorized.”); Josh Blackman, Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part I,
LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2017, 5:27 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-and-presidency-part-i
[https://perma.cc/M5WA-RY5U] (“[T]he president cannot obstruct justice when he exercises his lawful
authority that is vested by Article II of the Constitution.”). We are in full accord with Professors
Dershowitz and Blackman on this point. Our argument is that Article II does not authorize the president
to use his position and powers to advance purely personal, pecuniary, or partisan interests. Insofar as the
president acts on the basis of a good faith (if misguided) conception of his constitutional responsibilities,
then we, like Professors Dershowitz and Blackman, believe that the president would not be liable under
the obstruction statutes. We understand Professor Blackman’s views to be largely in harmony with ours,
though we disagree on whether obstruction by the president for purely partisan ends can be criminal.
See Josh Blackman, Obstruction of Justice and the Presidency: Part III, LAWFARE (Dec. 18, 2017, 9:00
AM), https://lawfareblog.com/obstruction-justice-and-presidency-part-iii [https://perma.cc/MT8NZE5M] (noting our divergence on this point).
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opponent on the eve of an election when the facts do not support those charges,
as was suggested (but not proven) in the Iglesias case.187
We would define “personal,” “pecuniary,” and “partisan” interests
narrowly. The president would be guilty of obstruction if he significantly
interferes with an investigation because he believes that it will likely bring to
light evidence of criminal activity or other wrongful or embarrassing conduct by
himself, his family members, or his top aides. This would not require proof of
any underlying offense or misdeed. As we have emphasized above, one can
obstruct an investigation that is headed toward a dead end.188 At the same time,
a president who interferes with an investigation because he knows there is no fire
underneath the smoke might justify his intervention on the grounds that the probe
was a waste of law enforcement resources.
Family members, in our view, should include first-degree blood relations,
as is the case under the Justice Department’s recusal rules for federal
prosecutors.189 Of course, applications will vary case by case. Interfering with
an investigation in order to protect a son-in-law with whom the president is
particularly close might constitute obstruction. The Justice Department’s recusal
regulation is again instructive: it prescribes that “[w]hether relationships
(including friendships) . . . are ‘personal’ must be judged on an individual basis,”
with “due regard” for the subjective opinion of the prosecutor whose objectivity
is under challenge.190 That regulation likewise recognizes that political
relationships should be judged on a case-by-case basis for conflict of interest
purposes.191 For example, a president’s national security advisor would almost
certainly qualify as a top aide to whom our standard would apply, but for many
others in the White House with more amorphous roles, the determination could
not be made based on title alone.
Our standard would apply both where the family member or aide is the
subject of the investigation, and where the family member or aide is not the
subject of the investigation but could be embarrassed by the outcome, even if he
or she never engaged in criminal activity. For example, the president would
violate the obstruction statutes by blocking an investigation because he thinks it
might bring to light negative information about a top aide, a family member, or
the president himself. He would likewise commit obstruction if he blocked an
investigation of a top aide based on personal friendship toward that individual.
A more difficult question is presented if the president interferes in an
investigation because he believes that the target of the probe has served the
nation admirably and is worthy of mercy. The use of the pardon power under
187. See supra notes 162–166 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
189. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(2) (2018).
190. See id.
191. See 28 C.F.R. § 45.2(c)(1) (stating that a prosecutor should recuse herself from an
investigation of an elected official with whom she has a “close identification . . . arising from service as
a principal adviser . . . or principal officer”).
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these circumstances would be proper. As discussed below, however, we do not
think that the existence of the pardon power justifies the surreptitious obstruction
of an ongoing inquiry.192
For cases in which the president orders a subordinate to bring baseless
charges against a target, we would likewise define the scope of the obstruction
statutes conservatively. Circumstances that might qualify would include a
president directing a prosecutor to bring unfounded charges against a political
opponent in the run-up to an election, or against an estranged spouse in order to
gain an upper hand in a divorce dispute. Again, the court (or the jury) would need
to be convinced that the president’s intervention was motivated by personal or
partisan interests—and not by a good faith, if controversial, view of his
constitutional responsibilities.
As for circumstances in which the president’s intervention might amount
to obstruction because it was motivated by pecuniary interests, our analysis is
informed by case law construing the federal bribery and extortion statutes.193
Under those provisions, a president commits a crime if he intervenes in an
investigation as part of a quid pro quo exchange for a contribution to his
reelection campaign,194 or—as we discuss below195—a donation to his
presidential library. Because obstruction for pecuniary purposes overlaps with
conduct already criminalized by other statutes, our focus here is on
circumstances in which the president acts for personal or partisan, rather than
pecuniary, reasons.
The most difficult questions arise when the president is accused of
obstructing justice for partisan ends. The president is the leader of his party as
well as the leader of the country, and it is accepted that he can use the powers of
his office to advance his party’s interests as well as his own political interest in
winning reelection or having a member of his party succeed him in office. The
distinction we seek to make is between actions that are consistent with the ideal
of political competition and those that are not. The former include actions that
benefit the president or his party politically because they advance a policy
agenda of which the public approves. The latter include actions that benefit the
president or his party by making it difficult for political opponents to make their
case to the public.
To understand this distinction, consider three scenarios: (1) a president
orders the Justice Department to stop prosecuting cases involving possession and
distribution of marijuana because he considers such efforts to be a poor use of
scarce enforcement resources; (2) a president orders the Justice Department to
stop prosecuting cases involving the possession and distribution of marijuana
192. See infra Part II.B.
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 872 (2018) (extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2018) (Hobbs Act).
194. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273–74 (1991).
195. See infra notes 227–231 and accompanying text.
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because he believes a “soft on pot” policy will draw younger voters to his party;
and (3) a president orders the Justice Department to drop a case involving
possession and distribution of marijuana by a senator from his own party who
stands for reelection the next month.
In the first scenario, the president would not be guilty of obstruction. As we
have argued above, the president’s obligation to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed” means that in certain circumstances he must prioritize the
enforcement of some laws over others, based on policy considerations.
Moreover, the president’s power over enforcement serves as a check against
congressional overcriminalization. Thus the president also might, in some cases,
choose to drop enforcement actions against people who violated a sedition law,
who evaded the draft, who entered the country illegally, and who failed to pay
their taxes. Constraints on these types of non-enforcement, if any, would come
from the constitutional norms discussed above.
The third scenario is also straightforward: the president acts improperly,
and thus corruptly, when he uses prosecutorial power to harass his political
enemies while sparing his friends. Of course, if the president adopted a broad
policy of prosecutorial forbearance in marijuana possession and distribution
cases, then applying that broad policy to a partisan ally would not amount to
obstruction. What the president cannot do is to abuse his position of power to
distort electoral outcomes by enforcing generally applicable laws only against
political enemies.
The second scenario is closer. Let us assume that the president writes a
memo clearly stating that his only reason for adopting the “soft on pot” policy is
to win votes—he thinks it is otherwise a bad policy. Imagine that he also
observes that the policy would throw the opposing party into turmoil, destroying
its electoral prospects for years to come. Isn’t his motive “narrowly partisan”?
We think that the president’s motive is legitimate. One can argue (though not all
would agree) that presidents should adopt policies that the public broadly
supports, as long as these policies do not exceed constitutional limits.196 What
the president cannot do is single out targets of law enforcement for harassment
or immunity based on their partisan leanings. This type of partisan or political
discrimination undermines political competition by forcing the party out of
power to devote resources to fend off prosecutions and other enforcement actions
based on behavior that is no different from that of the president’s supporters—
or, potentially, coerces opponents into silence so that they can avoid the
president’s wrath.
Our standard also does not result in criminal liability for the president if the
president blocks an investigation or prosecution that would have personally
196. See GARY L. GREGG II, THE PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLIC: EXECUTIVE REPRESENTATION AND
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 30 (1997) (describing the “delegate-mandate” model of executive
representation, which “requires the officeholder to be highly responsive to the . . . wishes of his or her
constituents”).
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embarrassed or harmed a prior president of the opposite party. For example,
President Obama’s decision not to prosecute former Bush administration
officials for torture197 does not count as obstruction of justice. Obama’s motive
was, apparently, to avoid criminalizing political differences—an important norm
in democratic politics. But what if his real motive was to avoid partisan attacks
that might have jeopardized his legislative priorities and threatened his
presidency? The decision not to prosecute begins to seem partisan rather than
public-spirited. While this case is nearer to the line, we think that the obstruction
statutes would not apply. Here, the president’s concern about partisan
polarization is close enough to a legitimate conception of the public interest that
applying the obstruction statutes in such a case would threaten his ability to do
what he believes is best for the nation.
Intervening in an investigation to ensure the success of a diplomatic
endeavor would also not constitute obstruction under our standard. Suppose, for
example, that the FBI is investigating someone for his possibly illegal financial
ties to Russia, and it turns out that the president has also retained this person as
an envoy to conduct sensitive back-channel negotiations. Under our standard,
the president could order the FBI to drop the case; such an action would be
consistent with the president’s role as commander in chief and the “organ of the
nation in its external relations.”198 By contrast, suppose the person is not an
envoy, but merely a friend or aide, and the president believes that if the
investigation came to light, he would not be able to obtain the votes for a health
care reform bill. Here, the national security defense would not hold. Nor could
the president legitimately defend himself on the ground that the health care
reform bill was a worthy piece of legislation. Manipulating the conduct of
criminal investigations in order to sway the outcome of congressional votes is
flatly inconsistent with the norms of political competition and persuasion that
undergird a constitutional democracy.
Our standard does not result in criminal liability for the president if the
president personally benefits from decisions by lower-level officials, like the
attorney general and the FBI director, not to prosecute or investigate cases. In
the absence of an actus reus, there can be no liability.199
197. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder
on Closure of Investigation into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 30, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-attorney-general-eric-holder-closure-investigationinterrogation-certain-detainees [https://perma.cc/96PX-N8B8].
198. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
199. Note that the attorney general and the FBI director also cannot be liable merely for failing
to bring a case unless some positive act can be identified. Examples of actus reus include ordering an
end to a probe begun by a subordinate official or destroying documents that might have assisted another
investigator (such as Congress) with an inquiry into the same matter. Imagine, for example, that the FBI
director refuses to investigate plausible claims that a family member of the president committed a crime.
While an argument can be made that officials should be liable for omissions—for failures to comply
with a positive official duty—we think that such a rule would interfere excessively with prosecutorial
and enforcement discretion.
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By contrast, Nixon clearly engaged in obstruction of justice, because he
interfered with investigations and proceedings that would have put him in legal
jeopardy and generated embarrassing information without any reason grounded
in public policy or his constitutional responsibilities for doing so. Nixon’s motive
was clearly partisan and probably personal as well. The Clinton case is also
straightforward. Because he interfered with a civil action and a grand jury
investigation for personal reasons—in order to protect himself from
embarrassment—he obstructed justice.
On the other hand, President Reagan and President George W. Bush might
not be liable for obstruction of justice under our standard. The charge that
President Reagan committed obstruction in the Iran-Contra affair seems to lack
an actus reus. If the president had sought to hide evidence from congressional
investigators regarding US dealings with the Iranians or the Contra rebels, that
would raise difficult questions about the line between the president’s
commander-in-chief role and Congress’s foreign affairs powers. The firing of
US Attorney David Iglesias is close to the line. If the facts are taken in their worst
light, President Bush or his top aides sought to speed up the prosecution of a
Democratic politician for partisan reasons. However, merely firing US attorneys
because they are not loyal to the administration or likely to serve its priorities is
not obstruction.
Let us consider some examples taken, in abstract form because of
ambiguities about the evidence at the time of this writing, from the recent turmoil
in the Trump administration. First, let’s imagine that a former campaign advisor,
a retired general, is accused of violating a provision of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act by failing to disclose certain payments he received from a
foreign government. Violations of this provision have been prosecuted in the past
but very rarely lead to prison sentences. The president believes that the retired
general technically violated the law but that the violation was an oversight that
resulted from the retired general’s lack of familiarity with the relevant provision.
The president believes that in light of the retired general’s decades of decorated
service to the nation, the investigation is unfair and should end. The president
orders an end to the investigation and threatens to fire the prosecutor pursuing
the probe unless the prosecutor drops the case.
This might be a case in which preemptively pardoning the retired general
would be justifiable on grounds of mercy. (We discuss the pardon power at
greater length in Part II.B.) But given the close political relationship between the
president and the retired general, the presumption of regularity would not apply.
It is, moreover, hard to see how the president’s intervention can be justified on
grounds of national security, or faithful execution, or the public good more
generally. Under these circumstances, we think the president’s purpose would be
improper, and so his interference would amount to obstruction of justice.
Imagine, now, that the president’s son is accused of violating a provision
of the Federal Election Campaign Act by accepting an in-kind contribution from
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a foreign government.200 There is no recorded case of any individual being
prosecuted successfully for accepting such an in-kind contribution. Lawyers and
legal scholars are divided as to whether the statute applies to the son’s conduct.201
A federal prosecutor begins an investigation targeting the son, and the president
believes that the investigation is motivated by the prosecutor’s own political
inclinations. The president orders an end to the investigation and threatens to fire
the prosecutor if he does not drop the probe. This case is closer. The president
has a responsibility to ensure that lower-level prosecutors do not misuse their
power for political ends. On the other hand, the president is by no means a
disinterested party here. He should recuse himself and allow, say, a high-ranking
official at the Justice Department with a reputation for fair-mindedness to make
the call. But we think that a court or a jury would likely, and appropriately,
consider the president’s purpose to be improper because of his personal stake in
the case and the very loose link to the public interest.
What if instead the president intervenes in an investigation because he
knows that it will reveal foreign interference in the last election and so will
undermine respect for the outcome? The president might argue that popular
confidence in presidential election results is an overriding national interest. Here,
too, we think his defense should fail. It is difficult to accept the argument that a
proper conception of the public interest entails concealing foreign infiltration in
the American electoral process. Again, the case comes down to mens rea and to
a judgment, informed by constitutional and prudential considerations, as to
whether the president’s purpose for intervening in the investigation can possibly
be characterized as proper.
In sum, historical examples and imaginative exercises generate easy cases
as well as hard ones. The president who intervenes in an investigation to cover
up sexual misconduct commits obstruction. The president who intervenes to hide
sensitive back-channel communications that might bring peace to the Middle
East does not violate the obstruction laws. No doubt the future will bring us new
200. See 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for . . . a foreign national, directly or
indirectly, to make . . . a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value . . . in connection
with a Federal, State, or local election . . . .”).
201. Compare Bob Bauer, Campaign Finance Law: When “Collusion” with a Foreign
Government
Becomes
a
Crime,
JUST
SECURITY
(June
2,
2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/41593/hiding-plain-sight-federal-campaign-finance-law-trumpcampaign-collusion-russia-trump [https://perma.cc/Y2FT-38SA] (arguing that “the hacking and
dissemination of the emails . . . were something of value,” and that 52 U.S.C. § 30121 “and related
regulations of the FEC separately prohibit any value given by a foreign national”), with Eugene Volokh,
Opinion, The Strikingly Broad Consequences of the Argument that Donald Trump Jr. Broke the Law by
Expressing Interest in Russian Dirt on Hillary Clinton, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 14,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/07/14/the-strikinglybroad-consequences-of-the-argument-that-donald-trump-jr-broke-the-law-by-expressing-interest-inrussian-dirt-on-hillary-clinton [https://perma.cc/CC3D-H7U5] (“[R]eading ‘thing of value’ to include
such politically damaging information would outlaw a broad range of constitutionally protected
opposition research. Such a reading would therefore make [52 U.S.C. § 30121] unconstitutionally
overbroad . . . .”).
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data points against which to test our suggested standard. Our purpose is not to
resolve all questions but to provide courts with a starting point from which to
work.
II.
COMPLICATIONS
A. Mixed Motives
Our analysis in Part I.D assumed a president acting on the basis of a single
motive. The analysis becomes more complicated when the president’s motives
are multiple. Imagine that the president intervenes in an investigation both
because he fears that it will bring to light information that might stymie a
critically important diplomatic effort and because he fears it will reveal evidence
that a foreign power meddled in the last election to bolster his own bid. How
should a court—or how should Congress in the impeachment context—weigh
the former (legitimate) purpose against the latter (improper) one? We believe
that a “but-for motive” rule, under which the president is liable only if he would
not have taken the action without the improper motive, appropriately balances
the relevant interests.
Courts that have confronted the mixed motives problem in the context of
nonpresidential obstruction have generally concluded that the mens rea
requirement is satisfied “if the offending action was prompted, at least in part,
by a ‘corrupt’ motive.”202 As one court of appeals has held, “a defendant’s
unlawful purpose to obstruct justice is not negated by the simultaneous presence
of another motive for his overall conduct.”203 For example, in one recent case, a
Philadelphia police officer was assigned to assist in a raid targeting a cocaine
kingpin whose girlfriend was the sister of a childhood friend. The officer called
the friend so that the friend could alert his sister of the impending raid. The
officer was later charged with and convicted of obstruction of justice in violation
of section 1505.204 The Third Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that “[e]ven if [the
officer]’s primary motivation was to extricate the sister of his childhood friend
from a troubled situation, he still could have intended to obstruct the [drug]
investigation to accomplish this goal.”205
202. United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978); accord United States v.
Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[O]ffending conduct must be prompted, at least in part,
by a corrupt motive.”) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also United States v. Burke, 125 F.3d 401,
404 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[D]efendant’s ‘altruistic’ motive . . . does not make it any less an
obstruction” for purposes of sentencing enhancement); United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 663 (2d
Cir. 1975) (suggesting but not holding that “evidence of a bad motive or purpose . . . is sufficient to
sustain a conviction even though a good motive is also present”); State v. Maughan, 305 P.3d 1058,
1062 (Utah 2013) (“[E]ven a mixed motive would still encompass a finding of specific intent to obstruct”
for purposes of state obstruction of justice statute).
203. United States v. Smith, 831 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2016).
204. United States v. Durham, 432 F. App’x 88, 89 (3d Cir. 2011).
205. Id. at 92 n.7.
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Yet it would be unwise to mechanically apply these mixed motives
precedents to the president. Presidents often act for a mix of personal, partisan,
and public-spirited reasons. Even when the president believes he is acting for the
good of the nation, he might also have in mind the thought that his actions will
raise his approval rating and thus improve his party’s prospects in the next
election. While we think that the president who obstructs an investigation solely
for partisan advantage commits the crime of obstruction, it would be absurd to
say that the president commits the crime of obstruction whenever he exercises
prosecutorial discretion with partisan politics in the back of his mind.
We suggest that a “but-for motive” rule makes more sense in the
presidential obstruction context.206 If the president would have taken the
challenged action for national security reasons or in executing his responsibility
to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, then he should not be found
guilty of obstruction. The application of the obstruction statutes to the president
should not prevent him from carrying out his constitutional role. However, if the
president would not have taken the challenged action in the exercise of his
constitutional functions, then he should not be able to claim Article II immunity
from obstruction liability. In that case, he should be treated like any other
defendant, for whom a corrupt motive is enough for criminal liability, even if
that corrupt motive is not the exclusive rationale for action.
B. Implications of the Pardon Power
So far, we have mentioned only in passing the president’s pardon power,
which further complicates the analysis of presidential obstruction. Article II,
Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution gives the president “Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachment.”207 The exception for cases of impeachment likely means, at
the least, that the president cannot save an official from impeachment by
pardoning him. It might also mean that the president cannot pardon someone
who has been impeached and convicted so as to save the ousted officeholder

206. For a discussion, see Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J.
1106, 1137–38 (2018).
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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from criminal consequences.208 With this one exception, the president’s pardon
power is plenary.209
The existence of the pardon power raises two questions about presidential
obstruction. The first is whether the president’s exercise of the pardon power can
ever itself constitute obstruction of justice. The second is whether the president’s
“greater” power to pardon gives him the “lesser” power to obstruct an
investigation, as Professor Alan Dershowitz has argued.210
There is no clear answer to either question, but the relevant legal materials
suggest that Congress can impeach a president for improper use of the pardon
power. Alexander Hamilton, whose broad conception of executive power is often
invoked by advocates of the unitary executive theory,211 said that a president who
uses the pardon power to shield associates from prosecution for treason could be
impeached and removed from office.212 The Supreme Court, agreeing with

208. The best evidence for the latter view comes from a speech by future Supreme Court Justice
James Iredell at the North Carolina ratifying convention. According to Iredell:
After trial [in the Senate] thus solemnly conducted, it is not probable that it would happen
once in a thousand times, that a man actually convicted would be entitled to mercy; and if the
President had the power of pardoning in such a case, this great check upon high officers of
state would lose much of its influence. It seems, therefore, proper that the general power of
pardoning should be abridged in this particular instance. The punishment annexed to this
conviction on impeachment can only be removal from office, and disqualification to hold
any place of honor, trust, or profit. But the person convicted is further liable to a trial at
common law, and may receive such common-law punishment as belongs to a description of
such offences, if it be punishable by that law.
3 THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 108 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1830).
209. As the Supreme Court put it, the pardon power “extends to every offence known to the law,
and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or
during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.” Moreover, the president’s pardon power
“cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
210. Alan Dershowitz, History, Precedent, and James Comey’s Opening Statement Show that
Trump
Did
Not
Obstruct
Justice,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(June
8,
2017),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/alan-dershowitz-history-precedent-and-james-comeys-openingstatement-show-that-trump-did-not-obstruct-justice/article/2625318 [https://perma.cc/WZT4-VZSP]
(“The president can, as a matter of constitutional law, direct the attorney general, and his subordinate,
the director of the FBI, tell them what to do, whom to prosecute and whom not to prosecute. Indeed, the
president has the constitutional authority to stop the investigation of any person by simply pardoning
that person.”)
211. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem
of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 456–58 (2008).
212. Hamilton writes:
A President . . . , though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course
of law, could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of impeachment and
conviction. Would not the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a
greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise against the public liberty, than
the mere prospect of an exemption from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the
design, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last expectation have any
influence at all, when the probability was computed that the person who was to afford that
exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be
incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired impunity?
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Hamilton, suggested in the 1925 case Ex parte Grossman that misuse of the
pardon power might be an impeachable offense.213 At the state level, Oklahoma
Governor J. C. Walton was impeached and convicted in 1923 for selling
pardons.214 Governor Ray Blanton of Tennessee was forced to leave office early
in 1979 amid similar allegations that his administration sold pardons.215
But to say that abuse of the pardon power is an impeachable offense is not
the same as to say it is criminal. Indeed, one could say the opposite: impeachment
alone provides the remedy for abuse of the pardon power because of worries that
criminalization would interfere with legitimate uses of executive power. In
Grossman itself, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to make an
exception to the pardon power for criminal contempt of court because of the
worry that such an exception would interfere with the president’s executive
discretion. This view is bolstered by a tradition of understanding the pardon
power in the broadest possible terms, enabling presidents not only to pardon
people who are unjustly convicted of breaking the law, or who deserve mercy
because of extenuating circumstances. Numerous presidents have pardoned
people for broad public policy purposes and even for reasons of narrow political
expediency, such as to reward political supporters and allies.216 If these types of
pardons should be regarded as constitutionally proper, then “abuse” of the
pardon power shrinks down to a very small subset.
Consider some recent controversies over the pardon power. President Ford,
who pardoned his predecessor Richard Nixon one month after taking office,
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Jeffrey
Crouch, The Law: Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power, 38 PRES. STUD. Q. 722, 723 (2008) (noting
that the expansiveness of the pardon power “was a general concern of the Anti-Federalists,” and that
“Hamilton attempted to quell these concerns” in FEDERALIST NO. 69 by arguing that “despite the wide
reach of the clemency power . . . the president would always be subject to impeachment if he ever acted
improperly, even if he pardoned treasonous allies”).
213. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 106–08 (1925). Grossman involved a Chicago bootlegger
who was convicted of contempt of court but pardoned by President Coolidge. The district judge ordered
the defendant’s imprisonment notwithstanding the president’s pardon, reasoning that the pardon power
did not extend to contempt charges. The Supreme Court rejected that argument. In a unanimous opinion,
Chief Justice Taft wrote:
If it be said that the President by successive pardons of constantly recurring contempts in
particular litigation might deprive a court of power to enforce its orders in a recalcitrant
neighborhood, it is enough to observe that such a course is so improbable as to furnish but
little basis for argument. Exceptional cases like this if to be imagined at all would suggest a
resort to impeachment rather than to a narrow and strained construction of the general powers
of the President.
Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
214. John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 POLITY
389, 392 (2003).
215. See Ex-Tenn. Gov. Ray Blanton Dies, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 1996),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1996/11/23/ex-tenn-gov-ray-blanton-dies/3988bcc36671-41a8-8e9f-51b5954dca05/?utm_term=.922c0c6d5fea [https://perma.cc/4UXV-ZZNC].
216. See Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power over Pardon and Amnesty: Legislative
Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225 (2003) (discussing
abuse of the pardon and possible legislative responses).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004876

2018]

PRESIDENTIAL OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

1323

justified his decision on the grounds that “the tranquility to which this nation has
been restored by [Nixon’s resignation] could be irreparably lost by the prospects
of bringing to trial a former President of the United States.”217 He added that
Nixon had “already paid the unprecedented penalty of relinquishing the highest
elective office of the United States.”218 Taking Ford’s words at face value, Ford
was motivated by the proper purposes of promoting the public welfare and
granting mercy to a man who had already suffered severe punishment. While at
the time there were calls for Ford’s impeachment,219 history has judged Ford
more kindly.220
History’s judgment has been less generous to President George H.W.
Bush’s decision to pardon former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and
several other Reagan administration officials for their role in the Iran-Contra
affair.221 When he granted those pardons on Christmas Eve 1992, less than a
month before he left office, Bush appealed to considerations of mercy.
Weinberger was, according to Bush, “a true American patriot” who had
“rendered long and extraordinary service to our country” over the course of
several decades, and who was now suffering from a “debilitating” illness while
also caring for his cancer-stricken wife.222 Bush’s suggestion that he pardoned
Weinberger and others to prevent “the criminalization of policy differences”
carried somewhat less force223: the independent counsel who doggedly pursued
the Iran-Contra investigation was a lifelong Republican and an early supporter
of Ronald Reagan.224 There was widespread speculation at the time that the true
motive for the pardons was to stall the independent counsel’s probe into Bush’s
own wrongdoing—and in particular, to prevent the independent counsel from
reviewing a diary Bush kept that had recently surfaced.225 Roughly half of
respondents in a late 1992 Gallup poll said they thought Bush granted the

217. Proclamation 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32, 601 (1974).
218. Id.
219. See YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, GERALD FORD AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE 1970S, at 30–31
(2005).
220. See, e.g., Award Announcement: President Ford Receives John F. Kennedy Profile in
Courage Award, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM (May 21, 2001),
https://www.jfklibrary.org/Events-and-Awards/Profile-in-Courage-Award/Award-Recipients/GeraldFord-2001.aspx [https://perma.cc/74BK-F5ND] (honoring Ford with the Profile in Courage Award for
making the “controversial decision of conscience to pardon former President Richard M. Nixon”).
221. See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 212, at 730 (“The Iran-Contra pardons may represent the start
of a new trend whereby presidents pardon not for traditional reasons of mercy or the public interest, but
to protect their own personal interests.”).
222. Proclamation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145 (1992).
223. Id. at 62, 146.
224. See Neil A. Lewis, Lawrence E. Walsh, Prosecutor in Iran-Contra Scandal, Dies at 102,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/us/politics/lawrence-e-walsh-irancontra-prosecutor-dies-at-102.html [https://perma.cc/Y7AA-VFWG].
225. See David Johnston, Bush Pardons 6 in Iran Affair, Aborting a Weinberger Trial;
Prosecutor
Assails
‘Cover-Up,’
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
25,
1992,
at
A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/1224.html [https://perma.cc/CH9K-AM4Y].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004876

1324

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1277

pardons “to protect himself from legal difficulties or embarrassment resulting
from his own role in Iran-Contra.”226
On his last day in office in January 2001, President Clinton pardoned the
fugitive financier Marc Rich, after Rich’s former wife donated $450,000 to
Clinton’s presidential library.227 The FBI and the US attorney for the Southern
District of New York later opened an inquiry and empaneled a grand jury to
consider possible charges of bribery, obstruction, money laundering, and related
offenses against Clinton.228 The investigation lasted more than two years but did
not result in an indictment.229
In an op-ed published a month after the pardon, Clinton gave several
justifications for his decision, including that other financiers who engaged in
similar transactions had faced only civil penalties, and that two well-respected
tax experts had defended Rich’s reporting position.230 Clinton also noted that
many present and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major political
parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America and Europe urged the
pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable
causes, to the Mossad’s efforts to rescue and evacuate Jews from hostile
countries, and to the peace process through sponsorship of education and health
programs in Gaza and the West Bank.231 This foreign policy rationale might be
characterized as a claim that “the public welfare will be better served” by the
granting of the pardons,232 which, if believed, would exonerate President Clinton
of obstruction (though perhaps not of bribery).
The investigation into Clinton suggests that, at least as of the early 2000s,
federal prosecutors and law enforcement officials were not convinced that the
pardon power gave the president absolute immunity for any exercise of executive
clemency. How might this view be squared with Ex parte Garland’s expansive
description of the pardon power?233 The most natural interpretation is that

226. Crouch, supra note 212, at 730.
227. See James V. Grimaldi, Denise Rich Gave Clinton Library $450,000, WASH. POST (Feb.
10, 2001), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2001/02/10/denise-rich-gave-clintonlibrary-450000/e0e10291-841a-4e38-893e-d500ee4a5b30/?utm_term=.13860212e0b1
[https://perma.cc/DN4S-QRR4].
228. See Josh Gerstein, Comey ‘Enthusiastic’ About Bill Clinton Probe in 2001, FBI Memo Says,
POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/james-comey-fbi-bill-clinton-233808
[https://perma.cc/62V4-5EXC].
229. See FBI Records: The Vault: William J. Clinton Foundation, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://vault.fbi.gov/william-j.-clinton-foundation [https://perma.cc/9Z72-UQUP]
(last visited July 11, 2017).
230. William Jefferson Clinton, Opinion, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2001),
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/opinion/my-reasons-for-the-pardons.html
[https://perma.cc/C9AB-GJD6].
231. Id.
232. See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
233. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (explaining that the pardon power “extends
to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before
legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment.”)
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Congress cannot limit the effect of a pardon that has been granted, but that
criminal law can still apply to the pardon’s grantor. Indeed, we think that it is
difficult to reject this interpretation unless one believes that a president who sells
pardons is immune from criminal liability—and we know of no one who
maintains that view.
Regardless of whether a president can commit the crime of obstruction by
granting a pardon, that does not resolve the separate question of whether the
president’s pardon power immunizes him from criminal liability for interfering
in an investigation under other circumstances. At least one scholar, Alan
Dershowitz, argues that the greater power to pardon includes the lesser power to
drop investigations.234 But while the greater power to pardon does bring some
lesser powers with it (such as the power to commute a heavier sentence to a
lighter one235 and the power to remit a fine236), Dershowitz’s claim that the
pardon power includes the power to block an investigation crumbles under
scrutiny.
First, setting aside the issue of whether the president violates the law when
he grants a pardon for an improper purpose, there remains substantial doubt as
to whether the president has the power to self-pardon. And if the president lacks
the “greater” power to self-pardon, then presumably he also lacks the “lesser”
power to obstruct an investigation of which he is a target. While the text of the
Constitution does not answer the question of whether the president can selfpardon,237 the structure of the Constitution arguably suggests that he cannot. As
noted above, other constitutional provisions appear to reflect a norm against selfdealing that is baked into the American system of government238—a norm that,
if applied broadly, would call the validity of self-pardons into question. It was

234. See Dershowitz, supra note 210.
235. See id. at 486–88 (holding that the president has the power to commute a sentence regardless
of whether the convict consents).
236. See Laura v. Bridgeport Steam-Boat Co., 114 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1885), describing how:
except in cases of impeachment and where fines are imposed by a co-ordinate department of
the government for contempt of its authority, the president, under the general, unqualified
grant of power to pardon offenses against the United States, may remit fines, penalties, and
forfeitures of every description arising under the laws of [C]ongress.
Id.
237. As Brian Kalt notes, a pardon might be defined as “an ‘act of grace’ visited on an inferior
by his superior,” which would suggest that a pardon necessarily involves a grantee who is separate from
the grantor. Cf. BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS
AND THEIR ENEMIES 44 (2012). But see id. at 44–45 (acknowledging that other definitions of “pardon”
do not appear to contemplate a bilateral arrangement).
238. See supra notes 180–184 and accompanying text; see also Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me:
The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779, 794–96 (1996). On the
other hand, one might argue that the fact that the Constitution lays out specific prohibitions against selfdealing signals that there is no such general rule; otherwise, the specific prohibitions would be
unnecessary. Cf. supra note 105 (noting Bork’s argument regarding the inference to be drawn from
legislative immunity provisions).
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on this ground that the Office of Legal Counsel concluded in the run-up to
Nixon’s resignation that a president cannot pardon himself.239
Further evidence against the validity of self-pardons comes from the debate
at the Constitutional Convention over the pardon clause. After Edmund
Randolph raised a concern that the president could use the pardon power to shield
himself from prosecution for treason, James Wilson, a strong proponent of
executive power, responded: “If [the President] be himself a party to the guilt he
can be impeached and prosecuted.”240 As Brian Kalt argues, this response
suggests “an assumption by Wilson that self-pardons were invalid.”241 After all,
if the president could self-pardon, then Wilson’s assurance that “he can be
impeached and prosecuted” would have been empty.242
The strongest argument against the claim that the president’s “greater”
pardon power includes the power to self-pardon derives from the exception in
cases of impeachment. If, as suggested above,243 this exception means that a
pardon is ineffective both as a bar to impeachment and as a bar to criminal
consequences after impeachment and removal, then the president does not have
an unfettered power to protect himself from prosecution. To be sure, a selfpardon in the waning days of a presidential term might shield the outgoing
president from criminal consequences as a practical matter. But until the
possibility of impeachment is eliminated, the prospect that the president might
be held criminally liable for offenses that are also impeachable remains at least
technically on the table.
An alternative rebuttal to the “greater includes the lesser” argument posits
that the power to publicly pardon a suspect is not greater than, but simply
different from, the power to intervene covertly in an investigation. Professor
Maxwell Stearns has made this point in response to Dershowitz: a pardon is
different, according to Stearns, because it is “out [in] the open, subject to media
scrutiny and challenge,” and thus the president can be “held politically
accountable.”244 This rebuttal rests on the assumption that pardons are
necessarily public—an assumption that is not necessarily correct. Chief Justice
Marshall said in the 1833 case United States v. Wilson that a pardon is a “private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for

239. See Presidential or Legislative Pardon of the President, I SUPPLEMENTAL OPINIONS OF THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 370, 370 (Aug. 5, 1974) (“Under the fundamental rule that no one may be
a judge in his own case, the President cannot pardon himself.”).
240. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
241. See Kalt, supra note 238, at 788.
242. Id. at 786.
243. See supra note 208.
244. Max Stearns, Two Strikes for Alan Dershowitz: Why Donald Trump Is Not Exempt from
Investigation
for
Obstruction
of
Justice,
BLINDSPOT
(June
10,
2017),
https://www.blindspotblog.us/single-post/2017/06/10/Two-Strikes-for-Alan-Dershowitz-WhyDonald-Trump-is-not-Exempt-from-Investigation-for-Obstruction-of-Justice [https://perma.cc/A5L2Y3UK].
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whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court.”245
Though Wilson itself did not involve a secret pardon, Marshall’s statement calls
into question the claim that a pardon necessarily differs from obstruction in its
publicity.
And yet still, the distinction between public-facing pardons and
surreptitious obstruction might serve to undermine the “greater includes the
lesser” argument here. United States v. Wilson stands for the proposition that a
pardon negates an indictment, conviction, or sentence only if the defendant
pleads it in court.246 So even if a pardon can be granted in secret, it does little
good for the grantee unless he brings it out into the public. Thus, the holding in
Wilson and the constitutional requirement for public trials in criminal cases247
arguably ensure that pardons ultimately must be made public if they are to have
any effect at all.
In sum, it is possible that the president can avoid criminal liability for
obstruction of justice by pardoning the target of an investigation rather than by
ordering subordinates to drop the case. But it is simply not clear that this is the
case. If, as we think, the president could be convicted of the crime of bribery if
he pardoned someone in return for a bribe, then we cannot rule out the possibility
that he could be convicted of obstruction of justice if he pardoned someone to
block an investigation for reasons untethered to his constitutional and legal
authority. But even if the president does not commit obstruction of justice in the
criminal sense through his use of the pardon power, he may commit the crime if
he orders subordinates to drop investigations or prosecutions.
C. Can the President Be Indicted for a Crime He Committed While in
Office?
The entire question of presidential obstruction of justice might seem idle if
the president cannot be indicted or convicted of a crime, as some commentators
have claimed.248 However, there are several reasons why it matters whether the
president can commit the crime of obstruction of justice. First, it is simply not
settled law that a president is immune from indictment while in office. Second,
even if a president cannot be indicted while in office, it may be possible to indict
and convict him after he leaves office of a crime he committed while in office.
245. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160–61 (1833).
246. See id. at 161–63.
247. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial . . . .”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982)
(recognizing that “the press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials”
and that “this right of access is embodied in the First Amendment”). The fact that courtrooms can be
closed under certain circumstances does not undermine the claim that, as a general matter, criminal
proceedings occur in the open, and so the Wilson rule ensures that in most cases a pardon must be
pleaded in public for it to be effective.
248. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Constitutional Puzzle: Can the President Be Indicted?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/us/politics/a-constitutional-puzzle-canthe-president-be-indicted.html [https://perma.cc/R3ZF-TQD8].
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Third, even if a president cannot be indicted for a crime committed while in
office, he may be impeached for such a crime. Below, we briefly discuss each of
these points.
The only authoritative legal analysis of the first claim comes from the
executive branch itself. In 1973, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Justice
Department issued an opinion that the president could not be indicted or
prosecuted while in office.249 Later that year, the solicitor general argued to a
court in connection with grand jury proceedings against Vice President Spiro
Agnew that, while the president may be immune from criminal prosecution, the
lesser impeachable officers were not.250 In 2000, the OLC revisited the question
and concluded that its earlier opinion was correct.251
The OLC opinions are open to question. Both opinions were issued from
the executive branch at a time that it was led by a president who was being
threatened with impeachment or had recently been impeached.252 And as the
OLC acknowledges, there is no textual basis for the claim that the president is
immune from indictment, and little in the way of historical support for that
claim.253 The Impeachment Judgment Clause says that a party who is impeached
is also “liable and subject to” the criminal process, implying that an impeached

249. Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Regarding the Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil
Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office, at 29 (Sept. 24, 1973),
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM4U-8DB7].
250. See Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice President’s Claim of
Constitutional Immunity, at 7 (filed Oct. 5, 1973), In re Proceedings of the Grand Jury Impaneled
December 5, 1972 (D. Md. 1973) (No. 73-965).
251. Randolph D. Moss, A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal
Prosecution,
24
OP.
O.L.C.
222,
223
(2000),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0222_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TH3C-VRPA].
252. For what it’s worth, an opinion letter from constitutional law professor Ronald Rotunda,
requested by independent counsel Kenneth Starr in 1998, concluded that “President Clinton is subject
to indictment and criminal prosecution, although it may be the case that he could not be
imprisoned . . . until after he leaves that office.” Mem. from Ronald D. Rotunda, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of
Law, to Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel, at 1 (May 13, 1998), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/07/22/us/document-Savage-NYT-FOIA-Starr-memopresidential.html [https://perma.cc/39XV-9CWT]. Rotunda’s memo reserved judgment on whether a
president could be indicted “for allegations that involve his official duties as President,” such as
allegations arising out of a “policy dispute between the President and Congress.” Id. at 2. Starr’s
successor as independent counsel, Robert Ray, ultimately decided not to pursue an indictment against
Clinton, but Ray’s decision came after Clinton left office and was not based on whether a sitting
president could be prosecuted. See ROBERT W. RAY, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL—
IN RE: MADISON GUARANTY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION—REGARDING MONICA LEWINSKY AND
OTHERS 41–49 (released Mar. 6, 2002) (stating that “sufficient evidence existed to prosecute [Clinton]
and that such evidence would ‘probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction . . . by an
unbiased trier of fact,’” but that “alternative sanctions”—including the suspension of Clinton’s law
license, fines and settlement payments totaling more than $965,000, and “substantial public
condemnation”—were “adequate substitutes for criminal prosecution”).
253. Moss, supra note 251, at 224–25.
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president could be convicted for the crime that led to impeachment.254 Alexander
Hamilton also expressed this view in the Federalist Papers.255
By contrast, there is no uncertainty as to whether a former president can be
convicted of a crime committed while in office. The Impeachment Judgment
Clause explicitly recognizes that he can, and the OLC agrees.256 There are good
policy reasons for such a view. The prospect of criminal liability may deter a
president from breaking the law, while post-tenure proceedings would not
interfere with presidential duties. This alone justifies our inquiry into whether
the obstruction of justice statute applies to the president.
Finally, the question of criminal liability matters because of the role it may
play in impeachment. The Impeachment Clause says that the president and other
public officials can be impeached for and convicted of “Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”257 There are different views about the
meaning of this clause. The reference to “crimes” may imply that impeachment
can occur only if the official has committed a crime.258 However, another
possible view is that a president can be impeached for purely “political” reasons,
such as losing the confidence of Congress, even if he does not commit a crime.259
An intermediate view is that Congress can impeach the president only for crimes
and for political acts that achieve a certain threshold of significance.260
254. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 3.
255. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 212, at 419 (Hamilton) (“The President of the
United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other
high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of law.”) (emphasis added). Hamilton’s use of the word “afterwards”
arguably suggests that the president cannot be prosecuted before he is removed from office.
256. Memorandum from Randolph Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the
Att’y Gen., Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same Offences for Which
He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate (Aug. 18, 2000),
https://www.justice.gov/file/19386/download [https://perma.cc/5GWK-VMC2].
257. U.S. CONST, art. II, § 4.
258. See Jerome S. Sloan & Ira E. Garr, Treason, Bribery, or Other High Crimes and
Misdemeanors, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 413, 430 (1974) (“On the eve of President Johnson’s indictment,
Dwight . . . asserted that ‘[t]he decided weight of authority is that no impeachment will lie except for a
true crime . . . .’”) (quoting Theodore W. Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, 6 AM. L. REGISTER 257
(1867)). But Sloan and Garr go on to rebut Dwight’s assertion. Id. at 430–40.
259. This was the view expressed by then-House Minority Leader Gerald Ford during a 1970
debate about the possible impeachment of Associate Justice William O. Douglas. See 116 CONG. REC.
11913 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1970) (statement of Rep. Ford) (“[A]n impeachable offense is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history; conviction results
from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to
require removal of the accused from office.”).
260. This was the view expressed by Charles Black in his classic monograph on impeachment,
see CHARLES BLACK JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974), and it seems to be Sunstein’s view as
well. See Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 285 (1998) (“[T]he
phrase ‘high Crimes and Misdemeanors’ would be read . . . to suggest illegal acts of a serious kind and
magnitude and also acts that, whether or not technically illegal, amount to an egregious abuse office.”).
The proposed article of impeachment of Nixon for tax fraud was rejected in part because “even if [the
crime of tax fraud] were proved, it was not the type of abuse of power at which the remedy of
impeachment is directed.” RODINO, supra note 3, at 223.
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Whatever the correct view, we think it important that in both the Nixon and
Clinton cases, the drafters of the articles of impeachment took care to note in
some of the articles that the president had committed a “crime.” In both cases,
articles that did not cite a crime were later dropped.261 At a minimum, some
members of Congress may not be willing to vote for impeachment or conviction
unless they can identify a serious underlying crime. For that reason, it is
important to determine whether a president can commit the crime of obstruction
of justice.
D. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance
We have acknowledged that applying the obstruction statutes to the
president poses difficult constitutional questions. One might argue that this fact
alone is sufficient to trigger the canon of constitutional avoidance—the principle
that “courts should try to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising difficult
questions of constitutional law.”262 Under this theory, if interpreting the
obstruction statutes to apply to the president raises difficult constitutional
questions, then courts should use an alternative interpretation.
This argument gains support from the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in
Franklin v. Massachusetts.263 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued
President George H.W. Bush and two other federal officials, claiming that the
Bush administration had miscalculated Massachusetts’s population following
the 1990 census in a way that reduced the state’s delegation to the House of
Representatives. Massachusetts alleged that the administration’s calculation
violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),264 which provides that courts
“shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to
be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”265 The Supreme Court rejected Massachusetts’s
argument, holding that the APA does not apply to the president. As Justice
O’Connor wrote for the majority:
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find
261. One proposed article of impeachment in the Nixon case charged that he had violated his
oath of office and disregarded his duty under the Take Care Clause by concealing bombing operations
in Cambodia. This article was rejected 26-12 by the House Judiciary Committee. See RODINO, supra
note 3, at 217–19. In the Clinton case, one of the proposed articles made similar charges: the president
had violated his oath of office and disregarded his duty under the Take Care Clause. See IMPEACHMENT
OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, supra note 153, at 14. This proposed article was passed out of the
House Judiciary Committee but was not one of the articles of impeachment eventually passed by the
House of Representatives. See H.R. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998).
262. Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 331, 331 (2015).
263. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
264. See id. at 790–91.
265. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
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that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the
provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by
Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his
statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.266
Might the same logic apply to the obstruction laws? After all, the relevant
statutes do not say explicitly that they reach the president. This argument may
seem attractive insofar as it would allow a court to avoid—or, at least, delay—
reconciling the obstruction statutes with the principle of presidential
prosecutorial discretion. The court would in effect be saying that if Congress
wants the obstruction statutes to apply to the president, it must say so explicitly.
But we do not think that this argument can carry the day. First, the Supreme
Court has said that the canon of constitutional avoidance “is a tool for choosing
between competing plausible interpretations of a provision,” and that the canon
“has no application in the absence of ambiguity.”267 In Franklin, the relevant
statute was arguably ambiguous: the term “agency,” while defined expansively
in the APA,268 is not a word that one usually uses to describe a single individual
such as the president. Here, by contrast, it is difficult to read “whoever” to mean
anything other than whoever. Interpreting the word “whoever” to mean
“whoever, except the president” does violence to the statutory language in a way
that the canon of constitutional avoidance neither requires nor allows.
Second, the constitutional avoidance argument sketched out above comes
into conflict with the holding in United States v. Nixon,269 in which the Supreme
Court applied Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to a sitting
president. That rule provides, in relevant part, that “[a] subpoena
may . . . command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books,
papers, documents or other objects designated therein.”270 Rule 17(c) does not
explicitly refer to the president as such a person. Notwithstanding the absence of
any explicit reference to the president, the Justices unanimously concluded that
the district court acted “consistent[ly] with Rule 17(c)” when it denied President
Nixon’s motion to quash a subpoena for Oval Office tape recordings.271 And
while the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Nixon did not mention the
canon of constitutional avoidance, it is difficult to square that decision with the
proposition that statutes do not apply to the president unless they specifically say
so.

266. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). The holding in Franklin might
alternatively be characterized as invoking a clear statement rule for statutory encroachments upon
presidential power. The choice between these two characterizations seems to us largely semantic.
267. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted); accord McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2015); Clark v. Suarez Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001).
268. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1) (2018)).
269. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974).
270. Id. at 698 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)).
271. Id. at 702.
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Third, and finally, every member of Congress who addressed the question
of whether the obstruction laws apply to the president during the Nixon and
Clinton impeachment proceedings concluded that they do.272 We are not aware
of any other instance in which any lawmaker has expressed the contrary view.
Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance would, at most, compel Congress
to recodify the proposition that the president cannot interfere with the due
administration of justice—a proposition that senators and representatives have
accepted for decades without doubt.
CONCLUSION
A president commits obstruction of justice when he significantly interferes
with an investigation, prosecution, or other law enforcement action to advance
narrowly personal, pecuniary, or partisan interests. This standard helps make
sense of the pattern of obstruction accusations against presidents since Nixon.
Of the nine presidents from Nixon to Trump, six of them have faced serious
accusations of obstruction as a result of their own actions or those of their aides—
Nixon, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Trump.
In all six of these cases, the trouble can be traced to personal, pecuniary, or
partisan motives.
Yet the notion that a president can commit obstruction of justice is a recent
development. As far as we know, before Nixon, exactly zero of the previous
thirty-six presidents were placed in legal or political jeopardy because of an
obstruction of justice allegation. Not even Andrew Johnson was accused of
obstruction of justice for his failure to enforce Congress’s Reconstruction
policies, even though the crime of obstruction had been defined by statute for
more than three decades by that point. What accounts for this significant change
in public attitudes?
We speculate that the answer lies in the concurrent expansion of
presidential power and federal criminal and civil law. Presidents have vastly
more resources at their disposal to advance their agendas than they did in the
past, due to the rise in the funding and staffing of the executive branch. Congress
has also delegated to presidents immense power by passing broad and frequently
vague laws that regulate many areas of life, including a great deal of political
behavior (raising money, conducting campaigns, and the like) as well as generic
laws relating to tax, business, and the like. Laws of both types can ensnare the
president’s rivals. This means that presidents can strengthen their position in
government through selective prosecution of their political opponents, along
with selective non-prosecution of their aides and supporters. Under these
circumstances, elections cannot exert much discipline on presidents, while the
impeachment process is cumbersome at best. Courts can normally intervene only

272.

See supra notes 146–147, 154–159 and accompanying text.
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at the request of the executive branch, which is controlled by the president.
Presidents seem unconstrained.
But it turns out that presidents are vulnerable to an institution that was not
foreseen by the founders as a check on presidential power: the immense and
prestigious legal and investigative bureaucracy. Both as a practical matter and as
a product of post-Watergate concerns about presidential abuse, these powerful
agencies enjoy considerable political autonomy from the president. These
institutions can and do, on their own, bring investigations when the president’s
abuse of power implicates the law, or entangles the president’s aides in legal
wrongdoing. When these agencies do bring an investigation, the president must
decide whether to try to block it or permit it. The agencies appear to enjoy enough
trust among the public that if the president blocks an investigation, he will pay a
political price.
All of this suggests that the 186-year-old obstruction of justice law has, in
the decades since Watergate, evolved into a major check on presidential power.
This check is often vigorously enforced by law enforcement authorities who are
nominally under the president’s control but who, as a matter of norms and
practice, have come to enjoy functional independence. While scholars have for
a long time pointed out that the executive branch contains “internal checks” that
may block the president from abusing power,273 the particular form that we have
identified has attracted little notice. Yet as compared to other internal checks,
such as the influence of the Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel and of
the various agency inspectors general, this one—with the threat of criminal
liability that comes with it—is perhaps the most potent.
Should we celebrate or bemoan this institutional development? The answer
is not easy because both theory and historical experience tell us that investigators
and prosecutors can abuse their power just as the president can. J. Edgar
Hoover’s abuse of power at the FBI led the Ford administration to exert greater
control over the agency.274 The perceived abuse of the powers of the independent
counsel led to its abolition. But the controversies surrounding Trump have
revived memories of Watergate, which was the impetus for Congress to pass the
independent counsel statute in the first place. The pendulum may be set to swing
in the other direction. That may be for the better: the president ought not stand
above the criminal law. But when laws are vague and law enforcement
authorities are independent, the risk on the opposite side is that all presidents will
permanently be under investigation even when they do nothing wrong. Unless
we think carefully about how criminal law can be harmonized with the
president’s constitutional responsibilities, we again run the risk that the
pendulum may swing too far.
273. For a recent statement, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012).
274. See Athan G. Theoharis, FBI Surveillance: Past and Present, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 889
(1984).
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